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- /* ssl/d1_both.c */
- /*
- * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
- * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
- */
- /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
- /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
- #include <limits.h>
- #include <string.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include "ssl_locl.h"
- #include <openssl/buffer.h>
- #include <openssl/rand.h>
- #include <openssl/objects.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/x509.h>
- #define RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(msg_len) (((msg_len) + 7) / 8)
- #define RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(bitmask, start, end) { \
- if ((end) - (start) <= 8) { \
- long ii; \
- for (ii = (start); ii < (end); ii++) bitmask[((ii) >> 3)] |= (1 << ((ii) & 7)); \
- } else { \
- long ii; \
- bitmask[((start) >> 3)] |= bitmask_start_values[((start) & 7)]; \
- for (ii = (((start) >> 3) + 1); ii < ((((end) - 1)) >> 3); ii++) bitmask[ii] = 0xff; \
- bitmask[(((end) - 1) >> 3)] |= bitmask_end_values[((end) & 7)]; \
- } }
- #define RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(bitmask, msg_len, is_complete) { \
- long ii; \
- OPENSSL_assert((msg_len) > 0); \
- is_complete = 1; \
- if (bitmask[(((msg_len) - 1) >> 3)] != bitmask_end_values[((msg_len) & 7)]) is_complete = 0; \
- if (is_complete) for (ii = (((msg_len) - 1) >> 3) - 1; ii >= 0 ; ii--) \
- if (bitmask[ii] != 0xff) { is_complete = 0; break; } }
- #if 0
- # define RSMBLY_BITMASK_PRINT(bitmask, msg_len) { \
- long ii; \
- printf("bitmask: "); for (ii = 0; ii < (msg_len); ii++) \
- printf("%d ", (bitmask[ii >> 3] & (1 << (ii & 7))) >> (ii & 7)); \
- printf("\n"); }
- #endif
- static unsigned char bitmask_start_values[] =
- { 0xff, 0xfe, 0xfc, 0xf8, 0xf0, 0xe0, 0xc0, 0x80 };
- static unsigned char bitmask_end_values[] =
- { 0xff, 0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x3f, 0x7f };
- /* XDTLS: figure out the right values */
- static const unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = { 1500, 512, 256 };
- static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off,
- unsigned long frag_len);
- static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p);
- static void dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
- unsigned long len,
- unsigned short seq_num,
- unsigned long frag_off,
- unsigned long frag_len);
- static long dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max,
- int *ok);
- static hm_fragment *dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len,
- int reassembly)
- {
- hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
- unsigned char *buf = NULL;
- unsigned char *bitmask = NULL;
- frag = (hm_fragment *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(hm_fragment));
- if (frag == NULL)
- return NULL;
- if (frag_len) {
- buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len);
- if (buf == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_free(frag);
- return NULL;
- }
- }
- /* zero length fragment gets zero frag->fragment */
- frag->fragment = buf;
- /* Initialize reassembly bitmask if necessary */
- if (reassembly) {
- bitmask =
- (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len));
- if (bitmask == NULL) {
- if (buf != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- OPENSSL_free(frag);
- return NULL;
- }
- memset(bitmask, 0, RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len));
- }
- frag->reassembly = bitmask;
- return frag;
- }
- void dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
- {
- if (frag->msg_header.is_ccs) {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(frag->msg_header.
- saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx);
- EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(frag->msg_header.
- saved_retransmit_state.write_hash);
- }
- if (frag->fragment)
- OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
- if (frag->reassembly)
- OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
- OPENSSL_free(frag);
- }
- static int dtls1_query_mtu(SSL *s)
- {
- if (s->d1->link_mtu) {
- s->d1->mtu =
- s->d1->link_mtu - BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s));
- s->d1->link_mtu = 0;
- }
- /* AHA! Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
- if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s)) {
- if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
- s->d1->mtu =
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
- /*
- * I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
- * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number
- */
- if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s)) {
- /* Set to min mtu */
- s->d1->mtu = dtls1_min_mtu(s);
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU,
- s->d1->mtu, NULL);
- }
- } else
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
- }
- /*
- * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
- * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
- */
- int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
- {
- int ret;
- unsigned int curr_mtu;
- int retry = 1;
- unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize, used_len;
- if (!dtls1_query_mtu(s))
- return -1;
- OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu(s)); /* should have something
- * reasonable now */
- if (s->init_off == 0 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
- OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num ==
- (int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
- DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
- if (s->write_hash) {
- if (s->enc_write_ctx
- && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
- mac_size = 0;
- else
- mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
- } else
- mac_size = 0;
- if (s->enc_write_ctx &&
- (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
- blocksize = 2 * EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
- else
- blocksize = 0;
- frag_off = 0;
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- /* s->init_num shouldn't ever be < 0...but just in case */
- while (s->init_num > 0) {
- if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && s->init_off != 0) {
- /* We must be writing a fragment other than the first one */
- if (frag_off > 0) {
- /* This is the first attempt at writing out this fragment */
- if (s->init_off <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
- /*
- * Each fragment that was already sent must at least have
- * contained the message header plus one other byte.
- * Therefore |init_off| must have progressed by at least
- * |DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 1| bytes. If not something went
- * wrong.
- */
- return -1;
- }
- /*
- * Adjust |init_off| and |init_num| to allow room for a new
- * message header for this fragment.
- */
- s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- } else {
- /*
- * We must have been called again after a retry so use the
- * fragment offset from our last attempt. We do not need
- * to adjust |init_off| and |init_num| as above, because
- * that should already have been done before the retry.
- */
- frag_off = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.frag_off;
- }
- }
- used_len = BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
- + mac_size + blocksize;
- if (s->d1->mtu > used_len)
- curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - used_len;
- else
- curr_mtu = 0;
- if (curr_mtu <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
- /*
- * grr.. we could get an error if MTU picked was wrong
- */
- ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
- if (ret <= 0) {
- s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
- return ret;
- }
- used_len = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + mac_size + blocksize;
- if (s->d1->mtu > used_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
- curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - used_len;
- } else {
- /* Shouldn't happen */
- return -1;
- }
- }
- /*
- * We just checked that s->init_num > 0 so this cast should be safe
- */
- if (((unsigned int)s->init_num) > curr_mtu)
- len = curr_mtu;
- else
- len = s->init_num;
- /* Shouldn't ever happen */
- if (len > INT_MAX)
- len = INT_MAX;
- /*
- * XDTLS: this function is too long. split out the CCS part
- */
- if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
- if (len < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
- /*
- * len is so small that we really can't do anything sensible
- * so fail
- */
- return -1;
- }
- dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off,
- len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
- dtls1_write_message_header(s,
- (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->
- data[s->init_off]);
- }
- ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
- len);
- if (ret < 0) {
- /*
- * might need to update MTU here, but we don't know which
- * previous packet caused the failure -- so can't really
- * retransmit anything. continue as if everything is fine and
- * wait for an alert to handle the retransmit
- */
- if (retry && BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
- BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED, 0, NULL) > 0) {
- if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
- if (!dtls1_query_mtu(s))
- return -1;
- /* Have one more go */
- retry = 0;
- } else
- return -1;
- } else {
- return (-1);
- }
- } else {
- /*
- * bad if this assert fails, only part of the handshake message
- * got sent. but why would this happen?
- */
- OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret);
- if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && !s->d1->retransmitting) {
- /*
- * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
- * we'll ignore the result anyway
- */
- unsigned char *p =
- (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off];
- const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
- int xlen;
- if (frag_off == 0 && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
- /*
- * reconstruct message header is if it is being sent in
- * single fragment
- */
- *p++ = msg_hdr->type;
- l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p);
- s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p);
- l2n3(0, p);
- l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p);
- p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- xlen = ret;
- } else {
- p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- xlen = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- }
- ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, xlen);
- }
- if (ret == s->init_num) {
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
- (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
- s->msg_callback_arg);
- s->init_off = 0; /* done writing this message */
- s->init_num = 0;
- return (1);
- }
- s->init_off += ret;
- s->init_num -= ret;
- ret -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- frag_off += ret;
- /*
- * We save the fragment offset for the next fragment so we have it
- * available in case of an IO retry. We don't know the length of the
- * next fragment yet so just set that to 0 for now. It will be
- * updated again later.
- */
- dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off, 0);
- }
- }
- return (0);
- }
- /*
- * Obtain handshake message of message type 'mt' (any if mt == -1), maximum
- * acceptable body length 'max'. Read an entire handshake message. Handshake
- * messages arrive in fragments.
- */
- long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
- {
- int i, al;
- struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr;
- unsigned char *p;
- unsigned long msg_len;
- /*
- * s3->tmp is used to store messages that are unexpected, caused by the
- * absence of an optional handshake message
- */
- if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message) {
- s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 0;
- if ((mt >= 0) && (s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt)) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- *ok = 1;
- s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size;
- return s->init_num;
- }
- msg_hdr = &s->d1->r_msg_hdr;
- memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
- again:
- i = dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn, max, ok);
- if (i == DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT || i == DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY) {
- /* bad fragment received */
- goto again;
- } else if (i <= 0 && !*ok) {
- return i;
- }
- /*
- * Don't change the *message* read sequence number while listening. For
- * the *record* write sequence we reflect the ClientHello sequence number
- * when listening.
- */
- if (s->d1->listen)
- memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, s->s3->read_sequence,
- sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
- else
- s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
- if (mt >= 0 && s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
- /* reconstruct message header */
- *(p++) = msg_hdr->type;
- l2n3(msg_len, p);
- s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p);
- l2n3(0, p);
- l2n3(msg_len, p);
- if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
- p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- msg_len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- }
- ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, msg_len);
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
- p, msg_len, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
- memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
- s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- return s->init_num;
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- *ok = 0;
- return -1;
- }
- static int dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr,
- int max)
- {
- size_t frag_off, frag_len, msg_len;
- msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
- frag_off = msg_hdr->frag_off;
- frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
- /* sanity checking */
- if ((frag_off + frag_len) > msg_len) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
- return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- }
- if ((frag_off + frag_len) > (unsigned long)max) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
- return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- }
- if (s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) { /* first fragment */
- /*
- * msg_len is limited to 2^24, but is effectively checked against max
- * above
- *
- * Make buffer slightly larger than message length as a precaution
- * against small OOB reads e.g. CVE-2016-6306
- */
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
- (s->init_buf, msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 16)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- return SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- }
- s->s3->tmp.message_size = msg_len;
- s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len = msg_len;
- s->s3->tmp.message_type = msg_hdr->type;
- s->d1->r_msg_hdr.type = msg_hdr->type;
- s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = msg_hdr->seq;
- } else if (msg_len != s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len) {
- /*
- * They must be playing with us! BTW, failure to enforce upper limit
- * would open possibility for buffer overrun.
- */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
- return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- }
- return 0; /* no error */
- }
- static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok)
- {
- /*-
- * (0) check whether the desired fragment is available
- * if so:
- * (1) copy over the fragment to s->init_buf->data[]
- * (2) update s->init_num
- */
- pitem *item;
- hm_fragment *frag;
- int al;
- *ok = 0;
- do {
- item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages);
- if (item == NULL)
- return 0;
- frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
- if (frag->msg_header.seq < s->d1->handshake_read_seq) {
- /* This is a stale message that has been buffered so clear it */
- pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages);
- dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
- pitem_free(item);
- item = NULL;
- frag = NULL;
- }
- } while (item == NULL);
- /* Don't return if reassembly still in progress */
- if (frag->reassembly != NULL)
- return 0;
- if (s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq) {
- unsigned long frag_len = frag->msg_header.frag_len;
- pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages);
- al = dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s, &frag->msg_header, max);
- if (al == 0) { /* no alert */
- unsigned char *p =
- (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- memcpy(&p[frag->msg_header.frag_off], frag->fragment,
- frag->msg_header.frag_len);
- }
- dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
- pitem_free(item);
- if (al == 0) {
- *ok = 1;
- return frag_len;
- }
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- s->init_num = 0;
- *ok = 0;
- return -1;
- } else
- return 0;
- }
- /*
- * dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes
- * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but
- * may be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it.
- */
- static unsigned long dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s)
- {
- unsigned long max_len =
- DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
- if (max_len < (unsigned long)s->max_cert_list)
- return s->max_cert_list;
- return max_len;
- }
- static int
- dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr, int *ok)
- {
- hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
- pitem *item = NULL;
- int i = -1, is_complete;
- unsigned char seq64be[8];
- unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
- if ((msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len ||
- msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
- goto err;
- if (frag_len == 0)
- return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
- /* Try to find item in queue */
- memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be));
- seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq >> 8);
- seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)msg_hdr->seq;
- item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be);
- if (item == NULL) {
- frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(msg_hdr->msg_len, 1);
- if (frag == NULL)
- goto err;
- memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
- frag->msg_header.frag_len = frag->msg_header.msg_len;
- frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
- } else {
- frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
- if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len) {
- item = NULL;
- frag = NULL;
- goto err;
- }
- }
- /*
- * If message is already reassembled, this must be a retransmit and can
- * be dropped. In this case item != NULL and so frag does not need to be
- * freed.
- */
- if (frag->reassembly == NULL) {
- unsigned char devnull[256];
- while (frag_len) {
- i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
- devnull,
- frag_len >
- sizeof(devnull) ? sizeof(devnull) :
- frag_len, 0);
- if (i <= 0)
- goto err;
- frag_len -= i;
- }
- return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
- }
- /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
- i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
- frag->fragment + msg_hdr->frag_off,
- frag_len, 0);
- if ((unsigned long)i != frag_len)
- i = -1;
- if (i <= 0)
- goto err;
- RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->frag_off,
- (long)(msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len));
- RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->msg_len,
- is_complete);
- if (is_complete) {
- OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
- frag->reassembly = NULL;
- }
- if (item == NULL) {
- item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
- if (item == NULL) {
- i = -1;
- goto err;
- }
- item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
- /*
- * pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted. However,
- * |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were, |pqueue_find|, above,
- * would have returned it and control would never have reached this
- * branch.
- */
- OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
- }
- return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
- err:
- if (frag != NULL && item == NULL)
- dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
- *ok = 0;
- return i;
- }
- static int
- dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr,
- int *ok)
- {
- int i = -1;
- hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
- pitem *item = NULL;
- unsigned char seq64be[8];
- unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
- if ((msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
- goto err;
- /* Try to find item in queue, to prevent duplicate entries */
- memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be));
- seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq >> 8);
- seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)msg_hdr->seq;
- item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be);
- /*
- * If we already have an entry and this one is a fragment, don't discard
- * it and rather try to reassemble it.
- */
- if (item != NULL && frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
- item = NULL;
- /*
- * Discard the message if sequence number was already there, is too far
- * in the future, already in the queue or if we received a FINISHED
- * before the SERVER_HELLO, which then must be a stale retransmit.
- */
- if (msg_hdr->seq <= s->d1->handshake_read_seq ||
- msg_hdr->seq > s->d1->handshake_read_seq + 10 || item != NULL ||
- (s->d1->handshake_read_seq == 0 && msg_hdr->type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED))
- {
- unsigned char devnull[256];
- while (frag_len) {
- i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
- devnull,
- frag_len >
- sizeof(devnull) ? sizeof(devnull) :
- frag_len, 0);
- if (i <= 0)
- goto err;
- frag_len -= i;
- }
- } else {
- if (frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
- return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok);
- if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
- goto err;
- frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len, 0);
- if (frag == NULL)
- goto err;
- memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
- if (frag_len) {
- /*
- * read the body of the fragment (header has already been read
- */
- i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
- frag->fragment, frag_len, 0);
- if ((unsigned long)i != frag_len)
- i = -1;
- if (i <= 0)
- goto err;
- }
- item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
- if (item == NULL)
- goto err;
- item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
- /*
- * pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted. However,
- * |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were, |pqueue_find|, above,
- * would have returned it. Then, either |frag_len| !=
- * |msg_hdr->msg_len| in which case |item| is set to NULL and it will
- * have been processed with |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, above, or
- * the record will have been discarded.
- */
- OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
- }
- return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
- err:
- if (frag != NULL && item == NULL)
- dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
- *ok = 0;
- return i;
- }
- static long
- dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
- {
- unsigned char wire[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
- unsigned long len, frag_off, frag_len;
- int i, al;
- struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
- redo:
- /* see if we have the required fragment already */
- if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s, max, ok)) || *ok) {
- if (*ok)
- s->init_num = frag_len;
- return frag_len;
- }
- /* read handshake message header */
- i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, wire,
- DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 0);
- if (i <= 0) { /* nbio, or an error */
- s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- *ok = 0;
- return i;
- }
- /* Handshake fails if message header is incomplete */
- if (i != DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* parse the message fragment header */
- dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr);
- len = msg_hdr.msg_len;
- frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off;
- frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len;
- /*
- * We must have at least frag_len bytes left in the record to be read.
- * Fragments must not span records.
- */
- if (frag_len > s->s3->rrec.length) {
- al = SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- /*
- * if this is a future (or stale) message it gets buffered
- * (or dropped)--no further processing at this time
- * While listening, we accept seq 1 (ClientHello with cookie)
- * although we're still expecting seq 0 (ClientHello)
- */
- if (msg_hdr.seq != s->d1->handshake_read_seq
- && !(s->d1->listen && msg_hdr.seq == 1))
- return dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(s, &msg_hdr, ok);
- if (frag_len && frag_len < len)
- return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, &msg_hdr, ok);
- if (!s->server && s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0 &&
- wire[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
- /*
- * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- we are
- * doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if their format is
- * correct. Does not count for 'Finished' MAC.
- */
- if (wire[1] == 0 && wire[2] == 0 && wire[3] == 0) {
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
- wire, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
- s->msg_callback_arg);
- s->init_num = 0;
- goto redo;
- } else { /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,
- SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- if ((al = dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s, &msg_hdr, max)))
- goto f_err;
- if (frag_len > 0) {
- unsigned char *p =
- (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
- &p[frag_off], frag_len, 0);
- /*
- * This shouldn't ever fail due to NBIO because we already checked
- * that we have enough data in the record
- */
- if (i <= 0) {
- s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- *ok = 0;
- return i;
- }
- } else
- i = 0;
- /*
- * XDTLS: an incorrectly formatted fragment should cause the handshake
- * to fail
- */
- if (i != (int)frag_len) {
- al = SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT, SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
- goto f_err;
- }
- *ok = 1;
- s->state = stn;
- /*
- * Note that s->init_num is *not* used as current offset in
- * s->init_buf->data, but as a counter summing up fragments' lengths: as
- * soon as they sum up to handshake packet length, we assume we have got
- * all the fragments.
- */
- s->init_num = frag_len;
- return frag_len;
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- s->init_num = 0;
- *ok = 0;
- return (-1);
- }
- /*-
- * for these 2 messages, we need to
- * ssl->enc_read_ctx re-init
- * ssl->s3->read_sequence zero
- * ssl->s3->read_mac_secret re-init
- * ssl->session->read_sym_enc assign
- * ssl->session->read_compression assign
- * ssl->session->read_hash assign
- */
- int dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b)
- {
- unsigned char *p;
- if (s->state == a) {
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- *p++ = SSL3_MT_CCS;
- s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
- s->init_num = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
- if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
- s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++;
- s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq, p);
- s->init_num += 2;
- }
- s->init_off = 0;
- dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, SSL3_MT_CCS, 0,
- s->d1->handshake_write_seq, 0, 0);
- /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
- dtls1_buffer_message(s, 1);
- s->state = b;
- }
- /* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */
- return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC));
- }
- int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code)
- {
- if (code > 0) {
- #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "invalid state reached %s:%d", __FILE__, __LINE__);
- #endif
- return 1;
- }
- if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s)) {
- /*
- * not a timeout, none of our business, let higher layers handle
- * this. in fact it's probably an error
- */
- return code;
- }
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- /* done, no need to send a retransmit */
- if (!SSL_in_init(s) && !s->tlsext_hb_pending)
- #else
- /* done, no need to send a retransmit */
- if (!SSL_in_init(s))
- #endif
- {
- BIO_set_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_FLAGS_READ);
- return code;
- }
- #if 0 /* for now, each alert contains only one
- * record number */
- item = pqueue_peek(state->rcvd_records);
- if (item) {
- /* send an alert immediately for all the missing records */
- } else
- #endif
- #if 0 /* no more alert sending, just retransmit the
- * last set of messages */
- if (state->timeout.read_timeouts >= DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT)
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING,
- DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
- #endif
- return dtls1_handle_timeout(s);
- }
- int dtls1_get_queue_priority(unsigned short seq, int is_ccs)
- {
- /*
- * The index of the retransmission queue actually is the message sequence
- * number, since the queue only contains messages of a single handshake.
- * However, the ChangeCipherSpec has no message sequence number and so
- * using only the sequence will result in the CCS and Finished having the
- * same index. To prevent this, the sequence number is multiplied by 2.
- * In case of a CCS 1 is subtracted. This does not only differ CSS and
- * Finished, it also maintains the order of the index (important for
- * priority queues) and fits in the unsigned short variable.
- */
- return seq * 2 - is_ccs;
- }
- int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s)
- {
- pqueue sent = s->d1->sent_messages;
- piterator iter;
- pitem *item;
- hm_fragment *frag;
- int found = 0;
- iter = pqueue_iterator(sent);
- for (item = pqueue_next(&iter); item != NULL; item = pqueue_next(&iter)) {
- frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
- if (dtls1_retransmit_message(s, (unsigned short)
- dtls1_get_queue_priority
- (frag->msg_header.seq,
- frag->msg_header.is_ccs), 0,
- &found) <= 0 && found) {
- #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "dtls1_retransmit_message() failed\n");
- #endif
- return -1;
- }
- }
- return 1;
- }
- int dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs)
- {
- pitem *item;
- hm_fragment *frag;
- unsigned char seq64be[8];
- /*
- * this function is called immediately after a message has been
- * serialized
- */
- OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
- frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(s->init_num, 0);
- if (!frag)
- return 0;
- memcpy(frag->fragment, s->init_buf->data, s->init_num);
- if (is_ccs) {
- /* For DTLS1_BAD_VER the header length is non-standard */
- OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
- ((s->version==DTLS1_BAD_VER)?3:DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH)
- == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
- } else {
- OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
- DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
- }
- frag->msg_header.msg_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
- frag->msg_header.seq = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.seq;
- frag->msg_header.type = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.type;
- frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
- frag->msg_header.frag_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
- frag->msg_header.is_ccs = is_ccs;
- /* save current state */
- frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
- frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash = s->write_hash;
- frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress = s->compress;
- frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session = s->session;
- frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
- memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be));
- seq64be[6] =
- (unsigned
- char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq,
- frag->msg_header.is_ccs) >> 8);
- seq64be[7] =
- (unsigned
- char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq,
- frag->msg_header.is_ccs));
- item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
- if (item == NULL) {
- dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
- return 0;
- }
- #if 0
- fprintf(stderr, "buffered messge: \ttype = %xx\n", msg_buf->type);
- fprintf(stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tlen = %d\n", msg_buf->len);
- fprintf(stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tseq_num = %d\n", msg_buf->seq_num);
- #endif
- pqueue_insert(s->d1->sent_messages, item);
- return 1;
- }
- int
- dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, unsigned long frag_off,
- int *found)
- {
- int ret;
- /* XDTLS: for now assuming that read/writes are blocking */
- pitem *item;
- hm_fragment *frag;
- unsigned long header_length;
- unsigned char seq64be[8];
- struct dtls1_retransmit_state saved_state;
- unsigned char save_write_sequence[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
- /*-
- OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 0);
- OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
- */
- /* XDTLS: the requested message ought to be found, otherwise error */
- memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be));
- seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(seq >> 8);
- seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)seq;
- item = pqueue_find(s->d1->sent_messages, seq64be);
- if (item == NULL) {
- #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "retransmit: message %d non-existant\n", seq);
- #endif
- *found = 0;
- return 0;
- }
- *found = 1;
- frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
- if (frag->msg_header.is_ccs)
- header_length = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
- else
- header_length = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- memcpy(s->init_buf->data, frag->fragment,
- frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length);
- s->init_num = frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length;
- dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, frag->msg_header.type,
- frag->msg_header.msg_len,
- frag->msg_header.seq, 0,
- frag->msg_header.frag_len);
- /* save current state */
- saved_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
- saved_state.write_hash = s->write_hash;
- saved_state.compress = s->compress;
- saved_state.session = s->session;
- saved_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
- saved_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
- s->d1->retransmitting = 1;
- /* restore state in which the message was originally sent */
- s->enc_write_ctx = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx;
- s->write_hash = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash;
- s->compress = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress;
- s->session = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session;
- s->d1->w_epoch = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch;
- if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch ==
- saved_state.epoch - 1) {
- memcpy(save_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence,
- sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
- memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, s->d1->last_write_sequence,
- sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
- }
- ret = dtls1_do_write(s, frag->msg_header.is_ccs ?
- SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC : SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
- /* restore current state */
- s->enc_write_ctx = saved_state.enc_write_ctx;
- s->write_hash = saved_state.write_hash;
- s->compress = saved_state.compress;
- s->session = saved_state.session;
- s->d1->w_epoch = saved_state.epoch;
- if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch ==
- saved_state.epoch - 1) {
- memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence,
- sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
- memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, save_write_sequence,
- sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
- }
- s->d1->retransmitting = 0;
- (void)BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
- return ret;
- }
- unsigned char *dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p,
- unsigned char mt, unsigned long len,
- unsigned long frag_off,
- unsigned long frag_len)
- {
- /* Don't change sequence numbers while listening */
- if (frag_off == 0 && !s->d1->listen) {
- s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
- s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++;
- }
- dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, mt, len, s->d1->handshake_write_seq,
- frag_off, frag_len);
- return p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- }
- /* don't actually do the writing, wait till the MTU has been retrieved */
- static void
- dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
- unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num,
- unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len)
- {
- struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
- msg_hdr->type = mt;
- msg_hdr->msg_len = len;
- msg_hdr->seq = seq_num;
- msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off;
- msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len;
- }
- static void
- dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off,
- unsigned long frag_len)
- {
- struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
- msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off;
- msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len;
- }
- static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
- {
- struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
- *p++ = msg_hdr->type;
- l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p);
- s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p);
- l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_off, p);
- l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_len, p);
- return p;
- }
- unsigned int dtls1_link_min_mtu(void)
- {
- return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) /
- sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0])) - 1]);
- }
- unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(SSL *s)
- {
- return dtls1_link_min_mtu() - BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s));
- }
- void
- dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr)
- {
- memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
- msg_hdr->type = *(data++);
- n2l3(data, msg_hdr->msg_len);
- n2s(data, msg_hdr->seq);
- n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_off);
- n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_len);
- }
- void dtls1_get_ccs_header(unsigned char *data, struct ccs_header_st *ccs_hdr)
- {
- memset(ccs_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct ccs_header_st));
- ccs_hdr->type = *(data++);
- }
- int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s)
- {
- int ret;
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- BIO *wbio;
- wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s);
- if (wbio != NULL && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(wbio) &&
- !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)) {
- ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(wbio);
- if (ret < 0)
- return -1;
- if (ret == 0)
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 1,
- NULL);
- }
- #endif
- ret = ssl3_shutdown(s);
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 0, NULL);
- #endif
- return ret;
- }
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
- {
- unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
- unsigned short hbtype;
- unsigned int payload;
- unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
- &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
- s, s->msg_callback_arg);
- /* Read type and payload length first */
- if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
- return 0; /* silently discard */
- if (s->s3->rrec.length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
- return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
- hbtype = *p++;
- n2s(p, payload);
- if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
- return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
- pl = p;
- if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
- unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
- unsigned int write_length = 1 /* heartbeat type */ +
- 2 /* heartbeat length */ +
- payload + padding;
- int r;
- if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
- return 0;
- /*
- * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte message type,
- * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
- */
- buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length);
- if (buffer == NULL)
- return -1;
- bp = buffer;
- /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
- *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
- s2n(payload, bp);
- memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
- bp += payload;
- /* Random padding */
- if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
- OPENSSL_free(buffer);
- return -1;
- }
- r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length);
- if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
- buffer, write_length, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
- OPENSSL_free(buffer);
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
- } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
- unsigned int seq;
- /*
- * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
- * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
- */
- n2s(pl, seq);
- if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
- dtls1_stop_timer(s);
- s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
- s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
- }
- }
- return 0;
- }
- int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
- {
- unsigned char *buf, *p;
- int ret = -1;
- unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
- unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
- /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
- if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
- s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
- return -1;
- }
- /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
- if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
- return -1;
- }
- /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
- if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- return -1;
- }
- /*
- * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
- * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
- */
- OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
- /*-
- * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
- * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
- * some random stuff.
- * - Message Type, 1 byte
- * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
- * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
- * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
- * - Padding
- */
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
- if (buf == NULL)
- goto err;
- p = buf;
- /* Message Type */
- *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
- /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
- s2n(payload, p);
- /* Sequence number */
- s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
- /* 16 random bytes */
- if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0)
- goto err;
- p += 16;
- /* Random padding */
- if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0)
- goto err;
- ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
- if (ret >= 0) {
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
- buf, 3 + payload + padding,
- s, s->msg_callback_arg);
- dtls1_start_timer(s);
- s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
- }
- err:
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- return ret;
- }
- #endif
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