Generate some superficial cover traffic over tor. The idea is that your tor client should not sit idle when you're not active, immediately betraying that you're not active.
Problem is that traffic correlation attacks can be very sophisticated and just adding some bursts of cover traffic doesn't help against all of them. If different entry nodes are used for the cover vs. real circuits, it doesn't help at all. however, only a few guards are normally used at a time (true?) Then it may help obfuscate things a little.
It's just an idea. Don't get lulled into a false sense of security. We're massively outgunned by a lawless cabal of immensely dangerous global adversaries, never forget that.
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/traffic-correlation-using-netflows
https://www.nrl.navy.mil/itd/chacs/sites/edit-www.nrl.navy.mil.itd.chacs/files/pdfs/13-1231-2077.pdf
https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/wpes11-panchenko.pdf
http://www.hamilton.ie/saman/ieee-icc15.pdf