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  1. New York Times, Decemter 22, 2019, page 1.
  2. Fighting the Good Fight Against Online Child Sexual Abuse
  3. Several websites popular with sexual predators were thwarted last month
  4. after a determined campaign by groups dedicated to eliminating the
  5. content. It was a rare victory in an unending war.
  6. By GABRIEL J.X. DANCE DEC. 22, 2019
  7. In late November, the moderator of three highly trafficked websites posted
  8. a message titled "R.I.P." It offered a convoluted explanation for why they
  9. were left with no choice but to close.
  10. The unnamed moderator thanked over 100,000 "brothers" who had visited and
  11. contributed to the sites before their demise, blaming an "increasingly
  12. intolerant world" that did not allow children to "fully express
  13. themselves."
  14. In fact, forums on the sites had been bastions of illegal content almost
  15. since their inception in 2012, containing child sexual abuse photos and
  16. videos, including violent and explicit imagery of infants and toddlers.
  17. Exploited Articles in this series examine the explosion in online photos
  18. and videos of children being sexually abused. They include graphic
  19. descriptions of some instances of the abuse.
  20. The sites managed to survive so long because the internet provides
  21. enormous cover for sexual predators. Apps, social media platforms and
  22. video games are also riddled with illicit material, but they have
  23. corporate owners -- like Facebook and Microsoft -- that can monitor and
  24. remove it.
  25. In a world exploding with the imagery -- 45 million photos and videos of
  26. child sexual abuse were reported last year alone -- the open web is a
  27. freewheeling expanse where the underdog task of confronting the predators
  28. falls mainly to a few dozen nonprofits with small budgets and outsize
  29. determination.
  30. Several of those groups, including a child exploitation hotline in Canada,
  31. hunted the three sites across the internet for years but could never quite
  32. defeat them. The websites, records show, were led by an experienced
  33. computer programmer who was adept at staying one step ahead of his
  34. pursuers -- in particular, through the services of American and other tech
  35. companies with policies that can be used to shield criminal behavior.
  36. But the Canadian hotline developed a tech weapon of its own, a
  37. sophisticated tool to find and report illegal imagery on the web. When
  38. the sites found the tool directed at them, they fought back with a smear
  39. campaign, sending emails to the Canadian government and others with
  40. unfounded claims of "grave operational and financial corruption" against
  41. the nonprofit.
  42. It wasn't enough. The three sites were overwhelmed by the Canadian tool,
  43. which had sent more than 1 million notices of illegal content to the
  44. companies keeping them online. And last month, they were compelled to
  45. surrender.
  46. "It's been a wonderful 7 years and we would've loved to go for another 7,"
  47. the sites' moderator wrote in his final post, saying they had closed
  48. because "antis," short for "anti-pedophiles," were "hunting us to death
  49. with unprecedented zeal."
  50. The victory was cheered by groups fighting online child sexual abuse, but
  51. there were no illusions about the enormous undertaking that remained.
  52. Thousands of other sites offer anybody with a web browser access to
  53. illegal and depraved imagery of children, and unlike with apps, no special
  54. software or downloads are required.
  55. The three shuttered sites had hidden their tracks for years using the
  56. services of Cloudflare, an American firm that provides companies with
  57. cyberprotections. They also found a hosting company, Novogara, that gave
  58. them safe harbor in the Netherlands -- a small country with a robust web
  59. business and laws that are routinely exploited by bad actors.
  60. Cloudflare's general counsel said the company had cooperated with the
  61. nonprofits and law enforcement and cut ties with the sites seven times in
  62. all, as they slightly altered their web addresses to evade targeting. A
  63. spokesman for Novogara said the company had complied with Dutch law.
  64. Last year, Europe eclipsed the United States as the top hosting location
  65. for child abuse material on the open web, according to a report by Inhope,
  66. a group that coordinates child abuse hotlines around the world. Within
  67. Europe, the Netherlands led the list. To report online child sexual abuse
  68. or find resources for those in need of help, contact the National Center
  69. for Missing and Exploited Children at 1-800-843-5678.
  70. In an interview in The Hague, the Dutch minister of justice, Ferdinand
  71. Grapperhaus, said he was embarrassed by the role Dutch companies played.
  72. "I had not realized the extent of cruelty, and how far it goes," he said.
  73. When hotlines like the one in Canada learn about illegal imagery, they
  74. issue a takedown notice to the owner of the website and its hosting
  75. company. In most cases, the content is removed within hours or days from
  76. law-abiding sites. But because the notices are not legally binding, some
  77. owners and web hosts ignore or delay.
  78. Several Dutch hosting companies will not voluntarily remove such content,
  79. insisting that a judge decide whether it meets the legal definition of
  80. so-called child pornography. Even when they agree, abuse imagery reappears
  81. almost at once, setting the cycle back in motion.
  82. The Dutch police say they do not have the resources to play what is
  83. essentially an endless game of Whac-a-Mole with these companies, according
  84. to Arda Gerkens, a Dutch senator who leads Meldpunt Kinderporno, the Dutch
  85. child abuse hotline.
  86. "It takes a lot of time," Ms. Gerkens said, "and basically, they are
  87. swamped."
  88. That means results like last month's, while relished by hotlines around
  89. the world, are likely to remain rare.
  90. Our Little Community
  91. The trio of shuttered websites first emerged in early 2012, according to
  92. domain records and transcripts of online chats.
  93. Their professed goal was to offer an easily accessible digital space for
  94. pedophiles and sexual predators to indulge their twisted obsessions, which
  95. had often been shunned even on notorious websites like 4chan and 8chan.
  96. At least initially, the sites steered clear of imagery that was obviously
  97. illegal, the records show, focusing instead on photos and videos of young
  98. children posing in revealing clothing. Even so, the founder of the sites
  99. identified in the transcripts expressed surprise in 2014 that they had
  100. "lasted so long."
  101. But the Canadians were already on to them. By then, the small hotline had
  102. been alerted to dozens of illegal images on the websites.
  103. As the sites gained in popularity, child sexual abuse content became more
  104. and more common. The transcripts, which include over 10,000 time-stamped
  105. messages on a chat app, show how the founder, a man identifying himself as
  106. Avery Chicoine, reveled in the opportunity to interact with others who
  107. shared his interests.
  108. "What we got here," he wrote in 2015, "is our little community."
  109. By 2017, the sites' home pages featured images of young girls that did not
  110. legally qualify as child pornography in most countries but signaled that
  111. there was plenty available a click away. One of the girls, no older than
  112. 7, lay on her back in sparse clothing with her legs spread; she had been a
  113. victim of sexual abuse, according to the Canadians, and was easily
  114. recognizable to predators through widely circulated imagery of the crimes.
  115. As illegal material flooded the sites, so did visitors. SimilarWeb, which
  116. measures internet traffic, estimated that the most popular of the sites
  117. received millions of visits a month earlier this year from an average of
  118. more than 500,000 unique visitors.
  119. The moderator of the sites in recent months boasted about the traffic in a
  120. series of emails and encrypted messages to The New York Times, attributing
  121. the popularity to the extreme content.
  122. The sites' many visitors were perhaps "the most hated people on earth," he
  123. said, describing them as belonging to an "oppressed sexual minority." He
  124. showed no remorse for their behavior, even casting the community of
  125. predators as visionaries whose crimes should be made legal.
  126. He did not identify himself and would not say if he was Mr. Chicoine -
  127. the sites' founder, according to the chat transcripts - or if he knew him.
  128. Last year, a Canadian by the name of Avery Chicoine with a lengthy
  129. criminal record was arrested in British Columbia and charged with
  130. possessing and distributing child pornography. The Canadian authorities
  131. would not say whether the charges related to the websites. According to
  132. court documents, he pleaded not guilty, and a trial is set for next month.
  133. He and his lawyer did not respond to requests for comment.
  134. The moderator would not address another pressing question: How had the
  135. sites managed to stay ahead of its pursuers so long?
  136. He said he did not want to hand a blueprint to his enemies, writing: "99%
  137. of attempts to bring us down fail. So I want the antis to keep wasting 99%
  138. of their time, instead of figuring out what works."
  139. In the chat transcripts, however, there were clues about the sites'
  140. evasion tactics. They pointed to a major cybersecurity firm, Cloudflare.
  141. A High-Tech Hideaway
  142. Based in San Francisco, Cloudflare built a billion-dollar business
  143. shielding websites from cyberattacks. One of its most popular services -
  144. used by 10 percent of the world's top sites, according to the company -
  145. can hide clients' internet addresses, making it difficult to identify the
  146. companies hosting them.
  147. The protections are valuable to many legitimate companies but can also be
  148. a boon to bad actors, though Cloudflare says it is not responsible for the
  149. content on its clients' sites. The man accused of a mass shooting at a
  150. Walmart in Texas had posted his manifesto on 8chan, an online message
  151. board that had been using Cloudflare's services and was well known for
  152. hosting hateful content. Cloudflare also came under criticism for
  153. providing services to the neo-Nazi site The Daily Stormer. (The company
  154. has since ended its relationship with both websites.)
  155. In the chat transcripts, the man identifying as Mr. Chicoine showed he was
  156. fully aware of the company's advantages when he signed on. "What
  157. cloudflare does is it masks and replaces your IP with one of theirs," he
  158. wrote in 2015, using the abbreviation for internet address.
  159. That year, he appeared to panic when a child abuse hotline identified one
  160. of his sites, telling a fellow moderator their operation was "finished."
  161. But when he later realized the hotline had sent the report to Cloudflare -
  162. and apparently not to the company that hosted the content - he seemed
  163. relieved. "Wait," he wrote, "may be ok."
  164. He was right.
  165. One month later, he expressed exasperation that a hotline had fired off
  166. another notice, this time to Cloudflare as well as the hosting company.
  167. The hotline confirmed the report with The Times. Still, the sites remained
  168. online.
  169. Interviews and records show that Cloudflare's services helped hold off the
  170. day of reckoning for Mr. Chicoine's sites by providing protections that
  171. forced hotlines to go to the company first.
  172. The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, the clearinghouse
  173. for abuse imagery in the United States, had sent Cloudflare notices about
  174. the sites starting in 2014, said John Shehan, a vice president at the
  175. center. Last year, it sent thousands.
  176. Even apart from the three sites, Mr. Shehan said, Cloudflare was well
  177. known to be used by those who post such content. So far this year, he
  178. said, the company had been named in 10 percent of reports about hosted
  179. child sexual abuse material. The center is in touch with Cloudflare "every
  180. day," Mr. Shehan said.
  181. Separately, records kept by the Canadian hotline, known as the Canadian
  182. Center for Child Protection, showed that since February 2017 there had
  183. been over 130,000 reports about 1,800 sites protected by Cloudflare.
  184. In December, the company was offering its services to 450 reported sites,
  185. according to records reviewed by The Times.
  186. Through its general counsel, Doug Kramer, Cloudflare said it worked
  187. closely with hotlines and law enforcement officials and responded promptly
  188. to their requests. It denied being responsible for the images, saying
  189. customer data was stored on its servers only briefly. Efforts to eliminate
  190. the content, the company said, should instead focus on the web-hosting
  191. companies.
  192. Records from the Canadian hotline revealed several cases in which abuse
  193. material stayed on Cloudflare's servers even after the host company
  194. removed it. In one instance, the imagery remained on Cloudflare for over a
  195. week afterward, allowing predators to continue viewing it.
  196. "The reality is that it is totally within Cloudflare�s power to remove
  197. child sexual abuse material that they have on their servers," said Lloyd
  198. Richardson, the technology director at the Canadian hotline.
  199. Records show that for several years, the sites were clients of Cloudflare,
  200. a U.S. tech company with servers in almost 200 cities in over 90 countries
  201. around the world that can be used to ward off cyberattacks.
  202. Cloudflare's protective services obscure a website's internet address.
  203. When you visit a protected site, you are actually communicating with a
  204. Cloudflare server located somewhere near you.
  205. Somebody visiting a protected site from Oklahoma, for example, may be
  206. directed to a Cloudflare server in Kansas City.
  207. That server will communicate with the website's server in turn, but only
  208. if it needs new information.
  209. Often, Cloudflare will already have the information requested in its
  210. systems.
  211. This means that images of abuse can remain on Cloudflare, even if they
  212. have been removed from the original host, according to records provided by
  213. a hotline in Canada.
  214. When asked why it did not cut ties with a number of companies known to
  215. host child sexual abuse imagery, Mr. Kramer said Cloudflare was not in the
  216. business of vetting customers' content. Doing so, he said, would have "a
  217. lot of implications" and is "something that we really have not
  218. entertained."
  219. Still, he said, the company had stopped providing services over the past
  220. eight years to more than 5,000 clients that had shared abuse material. And
  221. on Wednesday, the company announced a new product - currently in
  222. development - that would allow clients to scan their own sites.
  223. The tension over Cloudflare's protections reflects a larger debate about
  224. the balance between privacy on the internet and the need of law
  225. enforcement to protect exploited children. For example, Facebook's recent
  226. decision to encrypt its Messenger app, the largest source of reports last
  227. year about abuse imagery, was hailed by privacy advocates but would make
  228. it much more difficult for the authorities to catch sexual predators.
  229. Addressing that broad tension, Matt Wright, a special agent with the
  230. Department of Homeland Security, said law enforcement and the tech
  231. industry needed to find "a mutual balance" - "one where companies intended
  232. to secure data, and protect privacy, don't get in the way of our need to
  233. have access to critical information intended to safeguard the public,
  234. investigate crimes and prevent future criminal activity."
  235. Going Rogue in the Netherlands
  236. There were other clues about the sites' ability to stay online, in a trail
  237. of activity across the web that led to the Netherlands. Internet
  238. criminals come from far and wide to leverage Dutch technology, some of the
  239. best in the world, for the purposes of spam, malware and viruses. They do
  240. this by using rogue hosting companies, which are infamously uncooperative
  241. except in response to legal requests.
  242. "I realize that because we have such excellent internet logistics, we now
  243. have it on our plate," said Mr. Grapperhaus, the country's minister of
  244. justice.
  245. For child abuse sites like the ones identified as Mr. Chicoine's, a top
  246. draw has been the company Novogara, formerly known as Ecatel, one of the
  247. country's most criticized hosting businesses.
  248. The Chicoine sites were hosted on Novogara's servers for all of 2018 and
  249. through the early part of this year, records show. While working with the
  250. company, and without Cloudflare's protections at the time, the sites came
  251. under increasing pressure from the Canadians. Their hotline, along with at
  252. least four others around the world, stepped up their offensive, issuing
  253. hundreds of thousands of more reports about abuse imagery.
  254. The number was so great, according to the Dutch and Canadian hotlines,
  255. that Novogara blocked the groups' email addresses to avoid receiving
  256. additional notices. Ultimately, though, the targeting was effective:
  257. Novogara pulled the plug on the sites in May.
  258. Aside from sites like Mr. Chicoine's, the Dutch have an even larger
  259. problem with sexual predators taking advantage of platforms used to upload
  260. and share images. Since June, a company that hosts those platforms,
  261. NFOrce, has appeared in more than half of reports the Dutch hotline has
  262. received about illegal imagery. Over the past three years, sites using
  263. NFOrce servers have received more than 100,000 notices of illegal content,
  264. records show, but the company has not removed the material, according to
  265. Ms. Gerkens, who leads the hotline.
  266. NFOrce's sales operations manager, Dave Bakvis, said the company's hands
  267. were tied by Dutch laws, which prevent it from monitoring customer servers
  268. without a court order. He said NFOrce acted immediately when it received
  269. requests from the authorities. Separately, the websites themselves can
  270. and do remove the content.
  271. "I hate child pornography," Mr. Bakvis said.
  272. The Dutch national prosecutor for cybercrimes, Martijn Egberts, said in an
  273. email that issues involving "sovereignty" and "jurisdiction" complicated
  274. the removal of illegal material - leading the authorities to cooperate "as
  275. much as possible" with web hosts to get results.
  276. Legislation is now being drafted that would require Dutch web hosts to
  277. keep the material out of their systems, essentially forcing to them to
  278. scan for it. If a company falls short, it could face ever-increasing
  279. fines.
  280. Ben van Mierlo, the national police coordinator for online child sexual
  281. exploitation, said in an email that companies like Novogara "see
  282. themselves as a provider of a service." The challenge for the Dutch
  283. authorities and lawmakers, he said, was to convert them into partners in
  284. preventing the spread of illegal imagery.
  285. "There is no space in the Netherlands for those individuals or companies
  286. that threaten these basic rights for children," Mr. van Mierlo said.
  287. The Final Assault
  288. By May of this year, the moderator of the three sites was apoplectic,
  289. complaining in an email to The Times that "tolerance" for his views was
  290. coming to a halt.
  291. Over the next several months, the sites hopscotched around the world,
  292. finding more than a half-dozen new hosts - to pick up where Novogara left
  293. off - in Denmark, Russia, the Seychelles and elsewhere. For years, they
  294. had deployed a similar tactic of changing the last part of their web
  295. address - moving from .com to .org, for example - to avoid being targeted
  296. and blocked. Companies and governments that provide these domains often
  297. do not coordinate with one another, allowing offenders to move around the
  298. globe while largely preserving their site's identity.
  299. But there was no hiding this time.
  300. Records reviewed by The Times show that over seven years, the websites
  301. were directed to servers in over 20 countries, many of which are shown
  302. here.
  303. A borderless internet means bad actors can move their sites between
  304. countries, and even continents, in seconds.
  305. This complicates the work of child abuse hotlines and law enforcement
  306. agencies trying to eradicate images of child sexual abuse.
  307. The Canadian hotline, working from offices in Winnipeg, Manitoba, were
  308. using a computer program named Arachnid to crawl the internet in search of
  309. Mr. Chicoine's sites, and to send takedown notices whenever it identified
  310. illegal material.
  311. And as soon as the three sites reappeared somewhere, the Canadians reached
  312. out to the new hosts. In all, they found more than 18,000 confirmed images
  313. of abuse on the pages, reporting most of them hundreds of times each. It
  314. is also possible that law enforcement officials directed their firepower
  315. at the sites.
  316. Signy Arnason, the associate executive director of the Canadian center,
  317. described Arachnid as a "survivor-centric" endeavor, inspired by a survey
  318. that found victims of child sexual abuse feared being recognized in person
  319. by those who had viewed their abuse online.
  320. Since its launch two years ago, Arachnid has found more than 1.6 million
  321. confirmed images of child sexual abuse, and has sent more than 4.8 million
  322. takedown notices to websites and hosting providers. The British child
  323. sexual abuse hotline, the Internet Watch Foundation, has also developed a
  324. "spider" to crawl the internet. New software drove a surge in takedown
  325. requests
  326. Starting in 2013, abuse hotlines around the world sent a trickle of
  327. requests to remove images on the three sites - with little effect.
  328. Arachnid automated the detection process, creating a deluge that couldn't
  329. be ignored.
  330. "Arachnid is one oar - a big oar - in a ship of many oars rowing against
  331. this issue," said Denton Howard, executive director of Inhope, the
  332. organization supporting child abuse hotlines.
  333. Throughout the battle, the moderator of the sites would email the
  334. Canadians, accusing them of corruption and filling their inboxes with
  335. spam. He also contacted Canadian government agencies with false claims
  336. about the center, and even built software that altered the child sexual
  337. abuse imagery, hoping to trick Arachnid into skipping it over.
  338. It was not enough. All imagery of abuse has been removed from the sites,
  339. and the forums for the predators are closed, at least while their
  340. opponents have the upper hand.
  341. But as a parting shot, the home pages were filled with links to other
  342. sites that offered similar content, giving criminals a road map to
  343. continue their pursuits - and the groups dedicated to stopping them a list
  344. of new targets.
  345. Michael H. Keller contributed reporting from New York.
  346. Produced by Rich Harris, Virginia Lozano and Rumsey Taylor.
  347. END