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- # SARE HTML Ruleset for SpamAssassin - ruleset 0
- # Version: 01.03.10
- # Created: 2004-03-31
- # Modified: 2006-06-03
- # Usage instructions, documentation, and change history in 70_sare_html0.cf
- #@@# Revision History: Full Revision History stored in 70_sare_html.log
- #@@# 01.03.09: May 31 2006
- #@@# Minor score tweaks based on recent mass-checks
- #@@# Moved file 0 to file 2: SARE_HTML_EHTML_OBFU
- #@@# Moved file 0 to file 2: SARE_HTML_HEAD_AFFIL
- #@@# Moved file 0 to file 2: SARE_HTML_LEAKTHRU1
- #@@# Moved file 0 to file 2: SARE_HTML_LEAKTHRU2
- #@@# Moved file 0 to file 2: SARE_HTML_ONE_LINE3
- #@@# Moved file 0 to file 2: SARE_HTML_POB1200
- #@@# Moved file 0 to file 2: SARE_HTML_URI_HIDADD
- #@@# Moved file 0 to file 2: SARE_HTML_URI_LOGOGEN
- #@@# Moved file 0 to file 2: SARE_HTML_URI_OFF
- #@@# Moved file 0 to file 2: SARE_HTML_USL_B7
- #@@# Moved file 0 to file 2: SARE_HTML_USL_B9
- #@@# Moved file 0 to file 2: SARE_PHISH_HTML_01
- #@@# Added file 0: SARE_HTML_FLOAT1
- #@@# 01.03.10: June 3 2006
- #@@# Minor score tweaks based on recent mass-checks
- #@@# Added file 0 SARE_HTML_LINKWARN
- #@@# Added file 0 SARE_HTML_SPANNER
- # License: Artistic - see http://www.rulesemporium.com/license.txt
- # Current Maintainer: Bob Menschel - RMSA@Menschel.net
- # Current Home: http://www.rulesemporium.com/rules/70_sare_html0.cf
- #
- # Usage: This family of files, 70_sare_html*.cf, contain rules that test HTML strings within emails
- # (except URIs, which are handled in the 70_sare_uri*.cf family of files).
- #
- # File 0: 70_sare_html0.cf -- These are html rules that hit at least 10 spam and no ham.
- # While SARE cannot guarantee they never will hit ham, they have not hit ham in any SARE mass-check, against tens of thousands of ham.
- # This is a rules file we expect any/all email systems using SpamAssassin to benefit from.
- #
- # File 1: 70_sare_html1.cf -- These are html rules that meet one of the follow criteria:
- # a) Rules that do, or in the past have hit ham during SARE mass-check tests
- # b) Rules that hit no ham and currently do not hit more than 10 spam in any single mass-check run.
- # If the rules hit ham, they hit at last 10 spam to each 1 ham.
- # If the rules hit ham, they hit fewer than 100 ham
- # With few exceptions these rules score significantly less than the rules in file 0.
- # Systems which are very sensitive to false positives and/or need to be very careful about resource use may want to exclude this ruleset,
- # pick and choose among its rules, or lower their scores.
- # Systems that use this file 1 should ALSO use file 0.
- #
- # File 2: 70_sare_html2.cf -- These html rules hit no spam at this time, but they are considered "safe" rules that should never hit ham.
- # These are primarily rules that test for specific html seen only in spam, or similar types of "pretty darn sure" rules.
- # Systems which are very sensitive to SpamAssassin overhead may want to exclude this ruleset file to avoid its overhead,
- # but systems with plenty of resources that want to be aggressive against spam may benefit from this ruleset file.
- #
- # File 3: 70_sare_html3.cf -- These are html rules that hit a significant amount of ham during SARE mass-check tests.
- # Systems which are very sensitive to false positives or to SA resource usage should NOT install this ruleset.
- #
- # File 4: 70_sare_html4.cf -- These are html rules that meet one of the following criteria:
- # a) They hit over 100 ham during SARE mass-check tests, but still hit enough spam to be worth while to aggressively anti-spam systems.
- # b) They hit no emails at this time, but have been recommended by anti-spam sources.
- # Again, systems which are very sensitive to false positives or to SA resource usage should NOT install this ruleset.
- #
- # eng: 70_sare_html_eng.cf -- These are html rules which work well within the English language, but are liable to cause false
- # positives in other languages. They include rules which test for letter combinations. Systems that
- # receive ham in languages other than English should NOT use this file.
- #
- # x30: 70_sare_html_x30.cf -- These are html rules which have been incorporated into SpamAssassin 3.0.x,
- # or which duplicate or greatly overlap 3.0.x rules.
- # Systems which have installed SpamAssassin 3.0.x should therefore NOT use this file.
- #
- # arc: 70_sare_html_arc.cf -- These are html rules that once were published in other files, but which have since lost all value.
- # They either hit too much ham (without hitting enough spam to make it worth while), or they don't hit any spam.
- # SARE regularly runs mass-checks on these rules to see if any of them are worth reviving, but
- # we expect that nobody will be running these rules in any production system.
- #
- ######## ###################### ##################################################
- ######## ###################### ##################################################
- # Rules renamed or moved
- ######## ###################### ##################################################
- meta SARE_HTML_ALT_WAIT2 __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_BADOPEN __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_BAD_FG_CLR __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_COLOR_B __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_COLOR_NWHT3 __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_FONT_INVIS2 __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_FSIZE_1ALL __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_GIF_DIM __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_HTML_AFTER __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_HTML_DBL __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_HTML_TBL __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_IMG_ONLY __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_JVS_HREF __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_MANY_BR10 __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_MANY_BR10 __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_NO_BODY __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_NO_HTML1 __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_P_JUSTIFY __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_TITLE_SEX __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_URI_2SLASH __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_URI_AXEL __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_URI_BADQRY __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_URI_FORMPHP __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_URI_HREF __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_URI_MANYP2 __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_URI_MANYP3 __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_URI_NUMPHP3 __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_URI_OBFU4 __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_URI_OBFU4a __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_URI_PARTID __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_URI_RID __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_USL_MULT __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_FONT_EBEF __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_URI_DEFASP __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_INV_TAGA __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_EHTML_OBFU __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_HEAD_AFFIL __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_LEAKTHRU1 __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_LEAKTHRU2 __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_ONE_LINE3 __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_POB1200 __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_URI_HIDADD __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_URI_LOGOGEN __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_URI_OFF __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_USL_B7 __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_HTML_USL_B9 __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- meta SARE_PHISH_HTML_01 __SARE_HEAD_FALSE
- ######## ###################### ##################################################
- rawbody __SARE_HTML_HAS_A eval:html_tag_exists('a')
- rawbody __SARE_HTML_HAS_BR eval:html_tag_exists('br')
- rawbody __SARE_HTML_HAS_DIV eval:html_tag_exists('div')
- rawbody __SARE_HTML_HAS_FONT eval:html_tag_exists('font')
- rawbody __SARE_HTML_HAS_IMG eval:html_tag_exists('img')
- rawbody __SARE_HTML_HAS_P eval:html_tag_exists('p')
- rawbody __SARE_HTML_HAS_PRE eval:html_tag_exists('pre')
- rawbody __SARE_HTML_HAS_TITLE eval:html_tag_exists('title')
- rawbody __SARE_HTML_HBODY m'<html><body>'i
- rawbody __SARE_HTML_BEHTML m'<body></html>'i
- rawbody __SARE_HTML_BEHTML2 m'^</?body></html>'i
- rawbody __SARE_HTML_EFONT m'^</font>'i
- rawbody __SARE_HTML_EHEB m'^</html></body>'i
- rawbody __SARE_HTML_CMT_CNTR /<center><!--/
- # JH: These rules test for strange color combinations. There migth be even more powerful combinations, but I haven't had time to check them all
- rawbody __SARE_LIGHT_FG_COLOR /[^\-a-z]color\s{0,10}(?::|=(?:3d)?(?!3d))(?:[\s\'\"]){0,10}(?![\s\'\"])(?:\#?(?!\#)(?!fff\W|ffffff)(?:[e-f]{3}\W|(?:[e-f][0-9a-f]){3})|rgb(?:\((?!\s{0,10}255\s{0,10},\s{0,10}255\s{0,10},\s{0,10}255)\s{0,10}2[2-5][0-9]\s{0,10},\s{0,10}2[2-5][0-9]\s{0,10},\s{0,10}2[2-5][0-9]\s{0,10}\)|\((?!\s{0,10}100\s{0,10}%\s{0,10},\s{0,10}100\s{0,10}%\s{0,10},\s{0,10}100\s{0,10}%)\s{0,10}(?:100|9[0-9]|8[6-9])\s{0,10}%\s{0,10},\s{0,10}(?:100|9[0-9]|8[6-9])\s{0,10}%\s{0,10},\s{0,10}(?:100|9[0-9]|8[6-9])\s{0,10}%\s{0,10}\))|(?:Light(?:Cyan|Yellow)|(?:Ghost|Floral)White|WhiteSmoke|LemonChiffon|AliceBlue|Cornsilk|Seashell|Honeydew|Azure|MintCream|Snow|Ivory|OldLace|LavenderBlush|Linen|MistyRose))/i
- rawbody __SARE_WHITE_FG_COLOR /[^\-a-z]color\s{0,10}(?::|=(?:3d)?(?!3d))(?:[\s\'\"]){0,10}(?![\s\'\"])(?:\#?(?!\#)(?:fff\W|ffffff)|rgb(?:\(\s{0,10}255\s{0,10},\s{0,10}255\s{0,10},\s{0,10}255\s{0,10}\)|\\s{0,10}100\s{0,10}%\s{0,10},\s{0,10}100\s{0,10}%\s{0,10},\s{0,10}100\s{0,10}%\s{0,10}\))|white)/i
- rawbody __SARE_DARK_FG_COLOR /[^\-a-z]color\s{0,10}(?::|=(?:3d)?(?!3d))(?:[\s\'\"]){0,10}(?![\s\'\"])(?:\#?(?!\#)(?!000\W|000000)(?:[01]{3}\W|(?:[01][0-9a-f]){3})|rgb(?:\((?!\s{0,10}0\s{0,10},\s{0,10}0\s{0,10},\s{0,10}0\D)\s{0,10}[0-3]?[0-9]\s{0,10},\s{0,10}[0-3]?[0-9]\s{0,10},\s{0,10}[0-3]?[0-9]\s{0,10}\)|\((?!\s{0,10}0\s{0,10}%\s{0,10},\s{0,10}0\s{0,10}%\s{0,10},\s{0,10}0\s{0,10}%)\s{0,10}(?:[1-3]?[0-9])\s{0,10}%\s{0,10},\s{0,10}(?:[1-3]?[0-9])\s{0,10}%\s{0,10},\s{0,10}(?:[1-3]?[0-9])\s{0,10}%\s{0,10}\)))/i
- rawbody __SARE_BLACK_FG_COLOR /[^\-a-z]color\s{0,10}(?::|=(?:3d)?(?!3d))(?:[\s\'\"]){0,10}(?![\s\'\"])(?:\#?(?!\#)(?:000\W|000000)|rgb\s{0,10}\(\s{0,10}0\s{0,10},\s{0,10}0\s{0,10},\s{0,10}0\s{0,10}\)|rgb\s{0,10}\(\s{0,10}0\s{0,10}%\s{0,10},\s{0,10}0\s{0,10}%\s{0,10},\s{0,10}0\s{0,10}%\s{0,10}\)|black)/i
- rawbody __SARE_LIGHT_BG_COLOR /(?:bg|background\-)color\s{0,10}(?::|=(?:3d)?(?!3d))(?:[\s\'\"]){0,10}(?![\s\'\"])(?:\#?(?!\#)(?!ffffff|fff\W)(?:[e-f]{3}\W|(?:[e-f][0-9a-f]){3})|rgb(?:\((?!\s{0,10}255\s{0,10},\s{0,10}255\s{0,10},\s{0,10}255)\s{0,10}2[2-5][0-9]\s{0,10},\s{0,10}2[2-5][0-9]\s{0,10},\s{0,10}2[2-5][0-9]\s{0,10}\)|\((?!\s{0,10}100\s{0,10}%\s{0,10},\s{0,10}100\s{0,10}%\s{0,10},\s{0,10}100\s{0,10}%)\s{0,10}(?:100|9[0-9]|8[6-9])\s{0,10}%\s{0,10},\s{0,10}(?:100|9[0-9]|8[6-9])\s{0,10}%\s{0,10},\s{0,10}(?:100|9[0-9]|8[6-9])\s{0,10}%\s{0,10}\))|(?:Light(?:Cyan|Yellow)|(?:Ghost|Floral)White|WhiteSmoke|LemonChiffon|AliceBlue|Cornsilk|Seashell|Honeydew|Azure|MintCream|Snow|Ivory|OldLace|LavenderBlush|Linen|MistyRose))/i
- rawbody __SARE_WHITE_BG_COLOR /(?:bg|background\-)color\s{0,10}(?::|=(?:3d)?(?!3d))(?:[\s\'\"]){0,10}(?![\s\'\"])(?:\#?(?!\#)(?:fff\W|ffffff)|rgb(?:\(\s{0,10}255\s{0,10},\s{0,10}255\s{0,10},\s{0,10}255\s{0,10}\)|\(\s{0,10}100\s{0,10}%\s{0,10},\s{0,10}100\s{0,10}%\s{0,10},\s{0,10}100\s{0,10}%\s{0,10}\))|white)/i
- rawbody __SARE_DARK_BG_COLOR /(?:bg|background\-)color\s{0,10}(?::|=(?:3d)?(?!3d))(?:[\s\'\"]){0,10}(?![\s\'\"])(?:\#?(?!\#)(?!000\W|000000)(?:[01]{3}\W|(?:[01][0-9a-f]){3})|rgb(?:\((?!\s{0,10}0\s{0,10},\s{0,10}0\s{0,10},\s{0,10}0\D)\s{0,10}[0-3]?[0-9]\s{0,10},\s{0,10}[0-3]?[0-9]\s{0,10},\s{0,10}[0-3]?[0-9]\s{0,10}\)|\((?!\s{0,10}0\s{0,10}%\s{0,10},\s{0,10}0\s{0,10}%\s{0,10},\s{0,10}0\s{0,10}%)\s{0,10}(?:[1-3]?[0-9])\s{0,10}%\s{0,10},\s{0,10}(?:[1-3]?[0-9])\s{0,10}%\s{0,10},\s{0,10}(?:[1-3]?[0-9])\s{0,10}%\s{0,10}\)))/i
- rawbody __SARE_BLACK_BG_COLOR /(?:bg|background\-)color\s{0,10}(?::|=(?:3d)?(?!3d))(?:[\s\'\"]){0,10}(?![\s\'\"])(?:\#?(?!\#)(?:000\W|000000)|rgb\s{0,10}\(\s{0,10}0\s{0,10},\s{0,10}0\s{0,10},\s{0,10}0\s{0,10}\)|rgb\s{0,10}\(\s{0,10}0\s{0,10}%\s{0,10},\s{0,10}0\s{0,10}%\s{0,10},\s{0,10}0\s{0,10}%\s{0,10}\)|black)/i
- rawbody __SARE_HAS_BG_COLOR /(?:bg|background\-)color\s{0,10}(?::|=)/i
- rawbody __SARE_HAS_FG_COLOR /[^\-a-z]color\s{0,10}(?::|=)/i
- ######## ###################### ##################################################
- # <HTML> and <BODY> tag spamsign
- ######## ###################### ##################################################
- ######## ###################### ##################################################
- # <A> and HREF rules
- ######## ###################### ##################################################
- rawbody SARE_HTML_A_INV /href\w*href/i
- describe SARE_HTML_A_INV HTML has malformed anchor/href tag
- score SARE_HTML_A_INV 3.333
- #stype SARE_HTML_A_INV spamg
- #wasalso SARE_HTML_A_INV /href[a-z]*href/i
- #wasalso SARE_HTML_A_INV Fred's FR_FUNNY_HREF
- #wasalso SARE_HTML_A_INV /\w\whref=http:/i from David B Funk <dbfunk@engineering.uiowa.edu> Wed, 17 Mar 2004 04:04:58 -0600 (CST)
- #counts SARE_HTML_A_INV 8s/0h of 333405 corpus (262498s/70907h RM) 05/12/06
- #max SARE_HTML_A_INV 628s/0h of 66351 corpus (40971s/25380h RM) 08/21/04
- #counts SARE_HTML_A_INV 7s/0h of 9987 corpus (5656s/4331h AxB) 05/14/06
- #counts SARE_HTML_A_INV 38s/0h of 155327 corpus (103716s/51611h DOC) 05/14/06
- #counts SARE_HTML_A_INV 4s/0h of 13290 corpus (7418s/5872h CT) 05/14/06
- #max SARE_HTML_A_INV 23s/0h of 6944 corpus (3188s/3756h CT) 05/19/04
- #counts SARE_HTML_A_INV 2s/0h of 42447 corpus (34332s/8115h FVGT) 05/15/06
- #counts SARE_HTML_A_INV 8s/0h of 54067 corpus (16890s/37177h JH-3.01) 06/18/05
- #max SARE_HTML_A_INV 101s/0h of 38858 corpus (15368s/23490h JH-SA3.0rc1) 08/22/04
- #counts SARE_HTML_A_INV 3s/0h of 106350 corpus (72966s/33384h ML) 05/15/06
- #counts SARE_HTML_A_INV 0s/0h of 23068 corpus (17346s/5722h MY) 05/14/06
- #max SARE_HTML_A_INV 2s/0h of 31513 corpus (27912s/3601h MY) 03/09/05
- rawbody SARE_HTML_LINKWARN /\bShowLinkWarning\b/
- score SARE_HTML_LINKWARN 1.133
- describe SARE_HTML_LINKWARN Possible spam sign in HTML
- #hist SARE_HTML_LINKWARN Loren Wilton, April 2006
- #counts SARE_HTML_LINKWARN 126s/0h of 333405 corpus (262498s/70907h RM) 05/12/06
- #counts SARE_HTML_LINKWARN 5s/0h of 55981 corpus (51658s/4323h AxB2) 05/15/06
- #counts SARE_HTML_LINKWARN 17s/0h of 13285 corpus (7413s/5872h CT) 05/14/06
- #counts SARE_HTML_LINKWARN 60s/0h of 155481 corpus (103930s/51551h DOC) 05/15/06
- #counts SARE_HTML_LINKWARN 168s/0h of 42253 corpus (34139s/8114h FVGT) 05/15/06
- #counts SARE_HTML_LINKWARN 12s/0h of 106183 corpus (72941s/33242h ML) 05/14/06
- #counts SARE_HTML_LINKWARN 26s/0h of 22939 corpus (17232s/5707h MY) 05/14/06
- ######## ###################### ##################################################
- # Spamsign character sets and fonts
- ######## ###################### ##################################################
- rawbody SARE_HTML_FONT_LWORD m'^<font style=font-size:1px>[a-z]{30,}\.</font><br>'i
- describe SARE_HTML_FONT_LWORD unusual document format
- score SARE_HTML_FONT_LWORD 1.666
- #hist SARE_HTML_FONT_LWORD Loren Wilton: LW_SPAMFERSURE
- #counts SARE_HTML_FONT_LWORD 0s/0h of 333405 corpus (262498s/70907h RM) 05/12/06
- #max SARE_HTML_FONT_LWORD 194s/0h of 400504 corpus (178155s/222349h RM) 03/31/05
- #counts SARE_HTML_FONT_LWORD 2s/0h of 155327 corpus (103716s/51611h DOC) 05/14/06
- #counts SARE_HTML_FONT_LWORD 81s/0h of 54969 corpus (17793s/37176h JH-3.01) 03/13/05
- #counts SARE_HTML_FONT_LWORD 0s/0h of 31513 corpus (27912s/3601h MY) 03/09/05
- #counts SARE_HTML_FONT_LWORD 0s/0h of 10629 corpus (5847s/4782h CT) 09/18/05
- #max SARE_HTML_FONT_LWORD 2s/0h of 10826 corpus (6364s/4462h CT) 05/28/05
- full SARE_HTML_FONT_SPLIT /<font color=\n\n"?\#[a-f]\w[a-f]\w[a-f]\w"?>/i
- describe SARE_HTML_FONT_SPLIT HTML bright font color tag split by blank lines
- score SARE_HTML_FONT_SPLIT 1.666
- #hist SARE_HTML_FONT_SPLIT David B Funk <dbfunk@engineering.uiowa.edu> Wed, 17 Mar 2004 04:04:58 -0600 (CST)
- #overlap SARE_HTML_FONT_SPLIT Overlaps strongly with SARE_HTML_A_INV, though there's no regex overlap
- #overlap SARE_HTML_FONT_SPLIT Overlaps strongly with SARE_HTML_FONT_SPL for obvious reasons, but not enough to warrant dropping one.
- #counts SARE_HTML_FONT_SPLIT 5s/0h of 333405 corpus (262498s/70907h RM) 05/12/06
- #max SARE_HTML_FONT_SPLIT 431s/0h of 85073 corpus (62478s/22595h RM) 06/07/04
- #counts SARE_HTML_FONT_SPLIT 5s/0h of 9987 corpus (5656s/4331h AxB) 05/14/06
- #counts SARE_HTML_FONT_SPLIT 1s/0h of 13290 corpus (7418s/5872h CT) 05/14/06
- #max SARE_HTML_FONT_SPLIT 14s/0h of 6944 corpus (3188s/3756h CT) 05/19/04
- #counts SARE_HTML_FONT_SPLIT 31s/0h of 155327 corpus (103716s/51611h DOC) 05/14/06
- #counts SARE_HTML_FONT_SPLIT 6s/0h of 54067 corpus (16890s/37177h JH-3.01) 06/18/05
- #max SARE_HTML_FONT_SPLIT 65s/0h of 38858 corpus (15368s/23490h JH-SA3.0rc1) 08/22/04
- #counts SARE_HTML_FONT_SPLIT 3s/0h of 106350 corpus (72966s/33384h ML) 05/15/06
- #counts SARE_HTML_FONT_SPLIT 0s/0h of 26326 corpus (22886s/3440h MY) 02/15/05
- ######## ###################### ##################################################
- # <TITLE> Tag Tests
- ######## ###################### ##################################################
- ######## ###################### ##################################################
- # Obviously invalid html tag
- ######## ###################### ##################################################
- ######## ###################### ##################################################
- # Invalid or Suspicious URI Tests
- ######## ###################### ##################################################
- ######## ###################### ##################################################
- # <!-- Comment tag tests
- ######## ###################### ##################################################
- ######## ###################### ##################################################
- # Image tag tests
- ######## ###################### ##################################################
- rawbody SARE_HTML_IMG_CID2 /\"cid:(?:[A-Z]{8}\.){3}[A-Z]{8}_csseditor\"/ # no /i
- describe SARE_HTML_IMG_CID2 table spam image
- score SARE_HTML_IMG_CID2 2.222
- #hist SARE_HTML_IMG_CID2 Loren Wilton, May 2005
- #counts SARE_HTML_IMG_CID2 0s/0h of 333405 corpus (262498s/70907h RM) 05/12/06
- #max SARE_HTML_IMG_CID2 1224s/0h of 689155 corpus (348140s/341015h RM) 09/18/05
- #counts SARE_HTML_IMG_CID2 66s/0h of 13290 corpus (7418s/5872h CT) 05/14/06
- #max SARE_HTML_IMG_CID2 114s/0h of 10629 corpus (5847s/4782h CT) 09/18/05
- #counts SARE_HTML_IMG_CID2 63s/0h of 155327 corpus (103716s/51611h DOC) 05/14/06
- #counts SARE_HTML_IMG_CID2 2s/0h of 7500 corpus (1767s/5733h ft) 09/18/05
- #counts SARE_HTML_IMG_CID2 45s/0h of 54067 corpus (16890s/37177h JH-3.01) 06/18/05
- #counts SARE_HTML_IMG_CID2 8s/0h of 106350 corpus (72966s/33384h ML) 05/15/06
- #counts SARE_HTML_IMG_CID2 4s/0h of 23068 corpus (17346s/5722h MY) 05/14/06
- #max SARE_HTML_IMG_CID2 37s/0h of 57287 corpus (52272s/5015h MY) 09/22/05
- ######## ###################### ##################################################
- # Javascript and object tests
- ######## ###################### ##################################################
- ######## ###################### ##################################################
- # Header tags
- ######## ###################### ##################################################
- ######## ###################### ##################################################
- # Paragraphs, breaks, and spacings
- ######## ###################### ##################################################
- rawbody __SARE_HTML_FLOAT1A /^\s*(?:=(?:3[Dd])?\s*\"\s*)?float\s*(?:\:\s*)?$/i
- rawbody __SARE_HTML_FLOAT1B /^(?:\s*|=(?:3D)?")?float:?\s*$/i
- meta SARE_HTML_FLOAT1 __SARE_HTML_FLOAT1A || __SARE_HTML_FLOAT1B
- describe SARE_HTML_FLOAT1 Contains HTML formatting used in spam
- score SARE_HTML_FLOAT1 2.666
- #counts SARE_HTML_FLOAT1 574s/0h of 192466 corpus (93270s/99196h RM) 05/31/06
- #counts SARE_HTML_FLOAT1 21s/0h of 26358 corpus (22027s/4331h AxB2) 06/01/06
- #counts SARE_HTML_FLOAT1 125s/0h of 13285 corpus (7412s/5873h CT) 05/31/06
- #counts SARE_HTML_FLOAT1 1645s/0h of 162350 corpus (110752s/51598h DOC) 05/31/06
- #counts SARE_HTML_FLOAT1 40s/0h of 15726 corpus (7781s/7945h FT) 05/31/06
- #counts SARE_HTML_FLOAT1 3054s/0h of 119967 corpus (84310s/35657h ML) 05/31/06
- #counts SARE_HTML_FLOAT1 17s/0h of 22937 corpus (17232s/5705h MY) 05/31/06
- rawbody SARE_HTML_ORIG_MSG /^-----original message-----<br>$/
- describe SARE_HTML_ORIG_MSG Fake replied message?
- score SARE_HTML_ORIG_MSG 1.666
- #hist SARE_HTML_ORIG_MSG Tim Jackson, May 12, 2005
- #counts SARE_HTML_ORIG_MSG 65s/0h of 333405 corpus (262498s/70907h RM) 05/12/06
- #counts SARE_HTML_ORIG_MSG 6s/0h of 13290 corpus (7418s/5872h CT) 05/14/06
- #max SARE_HTML_ORIG_MSG 12s/0h of 10826 corpus (6364s/4462h CT) 05/28/05
- #counts SARE_HTML_ORIG_MSG 14s/0h of 9987 corpus (5656s/4331h AxB) 05/14/06
- #counts SARE_HTML_ORIG_MSG 38s/0h of 155327 corpus (103716s/51611h DOC) 05/14/06
- #counts SARE_HTML_ORIG_MSG 22s/1h of 54067 corpus (16890s/37177h JH-3.01) 06/18/05
- #counts SARE_HTML_ORIG_MSG 119s/0h of 106350 corpus (72966s/33384h ML) 05/15/06
- #counts SARE_HTML_ORIG_MSG 10s/0h of 23068 corpus (17346s/5722h MY) 05/14/06
- #max SARE_HTML_ORIG_MSG 154s/0h of 47221 corpus (42968s/4253h MY) 06/18/05
- rawbody SARE_HTML_SPANNER /> [a-z] <\/span>[a-z]<span/i
- describe SARE_HTML_SPANNER spammer is a SARE_HTML_SPANNER
- score SARE_HTML_SPANNER 2.222
- #hist SARE_HTML_SPANNER variation apparently scheduled for SA distribution in 3.2
- #hist SARE_HTML_SPANNER Robert Brooks, March 2006
- #counts SARE_HTML_SPANNER 1849s/0h of 333405 corpus (262498s/70907h RM) 05/12/06
- #counts SARE_HTML_SPANNER 7s/0h of 9982 corpus (5652s/4330h AxB) 05/14/06
- #counts SARE_HTML_SPANNER 108s/0h of 13285 corpus (7413s/5872h CT) 05/14/06
- #counts SARE_HTML_SPANNER 959s/0h of 155481 corpus (103930s/51551h DOC) 05/15/06
- #counts SARE_HTML_SPANNER 31s/0h of 42253 corpus (34139s/8114h FVGT) 05/15/06
- #counts SARE_HTML_SPANNER 3027s/0h of 106183 corpus (72941s/33242h ML) 05/14/06
- #counts SARE_HTML_SPANNER 9s/0h of 22939 corpus (17232s/5707h MY) 05/14/06
- ######## ###################### ##################################################
- # Suspicious tag combinations
- ######## ###################### ##################################################
- full SARE_HTML_CALL_ME m'\nPhone:\s+\d{3}-[\d\-<BR>]+\nMobile:\s+\d{3}-[\d\-<BR>]+\nEmail:\s+<A href.{1,100}</A>\n</DIV></BODY></HTML>'
- describe SARE_HTML_CALL_ME spammer sign in text
- score SARE_HTML_CALL_ME 2.222
- #hist SARE_HTML_CALL_ME Loren Wilton: LW_CALLME
- #counts SARE_HTML_CALL_ME 1s/0h of 333405 corpus (262498s/70907h RM) 05/12/06
- #max SARE_HTML_CALL_ME 1964s/0h of 400504 corpus (178155s/222349h RM) 03/31/05
- #counts SARE_HTML_CALL_ME 270s/0h of 155327 corpus (103716s/51611h DOC) 05/14/06
- #counts SARE_HTML_CALL_ME 0s/0h of 54969 corpus (17793s/37176h JH-3.01) 03/13/05
- #counts SARE_HTML_CALL_ME 0s/0h of 31513 corpus (27912s/3601h MY) 03/09/05
- #counts SARE_HTML_CALL_ME 0s/0h of 11260 corpus (6568s/4692h CT) 06/17/05
- ######## ###################### ##################################################
- # Miscellaneous tag tests
- ######## ###################### ##################################################
- ######## ###################### ##################################################
- # Useless tags (tag structures that do nothing)
- # Largely submitted by Matt Yackley, with contributions by
- # Carl Friend, Jennifer Wheeler, Scott Sprunger, Larry Gilson
- ######## ###################### ##################################################
- ######## ###################### ##################################################
- # Tests destined for other rule sets
- ######## ###################### ##################################################
- rawbody __SARE_PHISH_HTML_02a m'<a[\s\w=\.]+href=\"https?://\d+[^>]+>https://[^\d]'i
- full __SARE_PHISH_HTML_02b m'<a[\s\w=\.]+href=\"https?://\d+[^>]+>https://[^\d]'i
- meta SARE_PHISH_HTML_02 __SARE_PHISH_HTML_02a || __SARE_PHISH_HTML_02b
- score SARE_PHISH_HTML_02 2.500
- #stype SARE_PHISH_HTML_02 spamgg # phish
- #hist SARE_PHISH_HTML_02 Loren Wilton: SARE_PHISH_HTML_03
- describe SARE_PHISH_HTML_02 numeric href with https description
- #counts SARE_PHISH_HTML_02 49s/0h of 333405 corpus (262498s/70907h RM) 05/12/06
- #max SARE_PHISH_HTML_02 90s/0h of 689155 corpus (348140s/341015h RM) 09/18/05
- #counts SARE_PHISH_HTML_02 3s/0h of 56039 corpus (51703s/4336h AxB2) 05/15/06
- #counts SARE_PHISH_HTML_02 6s/0h of 13290 corpus (7418s/5872h CT) 05/14/06
- #counts SARE_PHISH_HTML_02 18s/0h of 155327 corpus (103716s/51611h DOC) 05/14/06
- #counts SARE_PHISH_HTML_02 34s/0h of 42447 corpus (34332s/8115h FVGT) 05/15/06
- #counts SARE_PHISH_HTML_02 5s/0h of 54969 corpus (17793s/37176h JH-3.01) 03/13/05
- #counts SARE_PHISH_HTML_02 3s/0h of 106350 corpus (72966s/33384h ML) 05/15/06
- #counts SARE_PHISH_HTML_02 2s/0h of 23068 corpus (17346s/5722h MY) 05/14/06
- rawbody __SARE_PHISH_HTML_03 m'<a\s+[\s\w=\.]*href=\"https?://\d+[^>]+>https://[^\d]'is
- full __SARE_PHISH_HTML_03a m'<a\s+[\s\w=\.]*href=\"https?://\d+[^>]+>https://[^\d]'is
- meta SARE_PHISH_HTML_03 __SARE_PHISH_HTML_03 || __SARE_PHISH_HTML_03a
- describe SARE_PHISH_HTML_03 numeric href with https description
- score SARE_PHISH_HTML_03 1.666
- #stype SARE_PHISH_HTML_03 spamg
- #hist SARE_PHISH_HTML_03 Loren Wilton, Feb 28 2005
- #counts SARE_PHISH_HTML_03 49s/0h of 333405 corpus (262498s/70907h RM) 05/12/06
- #max SARE_PHISH_HTML_03 90s/0h of 689155 corpus (348140s/341015h RM) 09/18/05
- #counts SARE_PHISH_HTML_03 3s/0h of 56039 corpus (51703s/4336h AxB2) 05/15/06
- #counts SARE_PHISH_HTML_03 6s/0h of 13290 corpus (7418s/5872h CT) 05/14/06
- #counts SARE_PHISH_HTML_03 18s/0h of 155327 corpus (103716s/51611h DOC) 05/14/06
- #counts SARE_PHISH_HTML_03 34s/0h of 42447 corpus (34332s/8115h FVGT) 05/15/06
- #counts SARE_PHISH_HTML_03 5s/0h of 54806 corpus (17633s/37173h JH-3.01) 03/13/05
- #counts SARE_PHISH_HTML_03 3s/0h of 106350 corpus (72966s/33384h ML) 05/15/06
- #counts SARE_PHISH_HTML_03 2s/0h of 23068 corpus (17346s/5722h MY) 05/14/06
- # EOF
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