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- include "../node_modules/circomlib/circuits/bitify.circom";
- include "../node_modules/circomlib/circuits/pedersen.circom";
- include "merkleTree.circom";
- // computes Pedersen(nullifier + secret)
- template CommitmentHasher() {
- signal private input nullifier;
- signal private input secret;
- signal output commitment;
- signal output nullifierHash;
- component commitmentHasher = Pedersen(496);
- component nullifierHasher = Pedersen(248);
- component nullifierBits = Num2Bits(248);
- component secretBits = Num2Bits(248);
- nullifierBits.in <== nullifier;
- secretBits.in <== secret;
- for (var i = 0; i < 248; i++) {
- nullifierHasher.in[i] <== nullifierBits.out[i];
- commitmentHasher.in[i] <== nullifierBits.out[i];
- commitmentHasher.in[i + 248] <== secretBits.out[i];
- }
- commitment <== commitmentHasher.out[0];
- nullifierHash <== nullifierHasher.out[0];
- }
- // Verifies that commitment that corresponds to given secret and nullifier is included in the merkle tree of deposits
- template Withdraw(levels, rounds) {
- signal input root;
- signal input nullifierHash;
- signal input receiver; // not taking part in any computations
- signal input relayer; // not taking part in any computations
- signal input fee; // not taking part in any computations
- signal input refund; // not taking part in any computations
- signal private input nullifier;
- signal private input secret;
- signal private input pathElements[levels];
- signal private input pathIndex[levels];
- component hasher = CommitmentHasher();
- hasher.nullifier <== nullifier;
- hasher.secret <== secret;
- nullifierHash === hasher.nullifierHash;
- component tree = MerkleTree(levels, rounds);
- tree.leaf <== hasher.commitment;
- tree.root <== root;
- for (var i = 0; i < levels; i++) {
- tree.pathElements[i] <== pathElements[i];
- tree.pathIndex[i] <== pathIndex[i];
- }
- // Add hidden signals to make sure that tampering with receiver or fee will invalidate the snark proof
- // Most likely it is not required, but it's better to stay on the safe side and it only takes 2 constraints
- // Squares are used to prevent optimizer from removing those constraints
- signal receiverSquare;
- signal feeSquare;
- signal relayerSquare;
- signal refundSquare;
- receiverSquare <== receiver * receiver;
- feeSquare <== fee * fee;
- relayerSquare <== relayer * relayer;
- refundSquare <== refund * refund;
- }
- component main = Withdraw(16, 220);
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