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- /*
- * Internal functions for the ML-KEM cryptosystem, exposed in a header
- * that is expected to be included only by mlkem.c and test programs.
- */
- #ifndef PUTTY_CRYPTO_MLKEM_H
- #define PUTTY_CRYPTO_MLKEM_H
- typedef struct mlkem_params mlkem_params;
- extern const mlkem_params mlkem_params_512;
- extern const mlkem_params mlkem_params_768;
- extern const mlkem_params mlkem_params_1024;
- /*
- * ML-KEM key generation.
- *
- * The official spec gives two APIs for this function: an outer one
- * that invents random data from an implicit PRNG parameter, and an
- * inner one that takes the randomness as explicit input for running
- * test vectors.
- *
- * To make side-channel testing easier, I introduce a third API inside
- * the latter. The spec's "inner" function takes a parameter 'd'
- * containing 32 bytes of randomness, which it immediately expands
- * into a 64-byte hash and then uses the two halves of that hash for
- * different purposes. My even-more-inner function expects the caller
- * to have done that hashing already, and to present the two 32-byte
- * half-hashes rho and sigma separately.
- *
- * Rationale: it would be difficult to make the keygen running time
- * independent of rho, becase the required technique for constructing
- * a matrix from rho uses rejection sampling, so timing will depend on
- * how many samples were rejected. Happily, it's also not _necessary_
- * to make the timing independent of rho, because rho is part of the
- * _public_ key, so it's sent in clear over the wire anyway. So for
- * testsc purposes, it's convenient to regard rho as fixed and vary
- * sigma, so that the timing variations due to rho don't show up as
- * failures in the test.
- *
- * Inputs: 'd', 'z', 'rho' and 'sigma' are all 32-byte random strings.
- *
- * Return: the encryption and decryption keys are written to the two
- * provided BinarySinks.
- */
- void mlkem_keygen(
- BinarySink *ek, BinarySink *dk, const mlkem_params *params);
- void mlkem_keygen_internal(
- BinarySink *ek, BinarySink *dk, const mlkem_params *params,
- const void *d, const void *z);
- void mlkem_keygen_rho_sigma(
- BinarySink *ek, BinarySink *dk, const mlkem_params *params,
- const void *rho, const void *sigma, const void *z);
- /*
- * ML-KEM key encapsulation, with only two forms, the outer (random)
- * and inner (for test vectors) versions from the spec.
- *
- * Inputs: the encryption key from keygen. 'm' should be a 32-byte
- * random string if provided.
- *
- * Returns: if successful, returns true, and writes to the two
- * BinarySinks a ciphertext to send to the other side, and our copy of
- * the output shared secret k. If failure, returns false, and the
- * strbuf pointers aren't filled in at all.
- */
- bool mlkem_encaps(BinarySink *ciphertext, BinarySink *kout,
- const mlkem_params *params, ptrlen ek);
- bool mlkem_encaps_internal(BinarySink *ciphertext, BinarySink *kout,
- const mlkem_params *params, ptrlen ek,
- const void *m);
- /*
- * ML-KEM key decapsulation. This doesn't use any randomness, so even
- * the official spec only presents one version of it. (Actually it
- * defines two functions, but the outer one adds nothing over the
- * inner one.)
- *
- * Inputs: the decryption key from keygen, and the ciphertext output
- * from encapsulation.
- *
- * Returns: false on validation failure, and true otherwise
- * (regardless of whether the ciphertext was implicitly rejected). The
- * shared secret k is written to the provided BinarySink.
- */
- bool mlkem_decaps(BinarySink *k, const mlkem_params *params,
- ptrlen dk, ptrlen c);
- #endif /* PUTTY_CRYPTO_MLKEM_H */
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