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- # coding=utf-8
- #
- # KDF.py : a collection of Key Derivation Functions
- #
- # Part of the Python Cryptography Toolkit
- #
- # ===================================================================
- # The contents of this file are dedicated to the public domain. To
- # the extent that dedication to the public domain is not available,
- # everyone is granted a worldwide, perpetual, royalty-free,
- # non-exclusive license to exercise all rights associated with the
- # contents of this file for any purpose whatsoever.
- # No rights are reserved.
- #
- # THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
- # EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
- # MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
- # NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
- # BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
- # ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
- # CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
- # SOFTWARE.
- # ===================================================================
- import re
- import struct
- from functools import reduce
- from Cryptodome.Util.py3compat import (tobytes, bord, _copy_bytes, iter_range,
- tostr, bchr, bstr)
- from Cryptodome.Hash import SHA1, SHA256, HMAC, CMAC, BLAKE2s
- from Cryptodome.Util.strxor import strxor
- from Cryptodome.Random import get_random_bytes
- from Cryptodome.Util.number import size as bit_size, long_to_bytes, bytes_to_long
- from Cryptodome.Util._raw_api import (load_pycryptodome_raw_lib,
- create_string_buffer,
- get_raw_buffer, c_size_t)
- _raw_salsa20_lib = load_pycryptodome_raw_lib("Cryptodome.Cipher._Salsa20",
- """
- int Salsa20_8_core(const uint8_t *x, const uint8_t *y,
- uint8_t *out);
- """)
- _raw_scrypt_lib = load_pycryptodome_raw_lib("Cryptodome.Protocol._scrypt",
- """
- typedef int (core_t)(const uint8_t [64], const uint8_t [64], uint8_t [64]);
- int scryptROMix(const uint8_t *data_in, uint8_t *data_out,
- size_t data_len, unsigned N, core_t *core);
- """)
- def PBKDF1(password, salt, dkLen, count=1000, hashAlgo=None):
- """Derive one key from a password (or passphrase).
- This function performs key derivation according to an old version of
- the PKCS#5 standard (v1.5) or `RFC2898
- <https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2898.txt>`_.
- Args:
- password (string):
- The secret password to generate the key from.
- salt (byte string):
- An 8 byte string to use for better protection from dictionary attacks.
- This value does not need to be kept secret, but it should be randomly
- chosen for each derivation.
- dkLen (integer):
- The length of the desired key. The default is 16 bytes, suitable for
- instance for :mod:`Cryptodome.Cipher.AES`.
- count (integer):
- The number of iterations to carry out. The recommendation is 1000 or
- more.
- hashAlgo (module):
- The hash algorithm to use, as a module or an object from the :mod:`Cryptodome.Hash` package.
- The digest length must be no shorter than ``dkLen``.
- The default algorithm is :mod:`Cryptodome.Hash.SHA1`.
- Return:
- A byte string of length ``dkLen`` that can be used as key.
- """
- if not hashAlgo:
- hashAlgo = SHA1
- password = tobytes(password)
- pHash = hashAlgo.new(password+salt)
- digest = pHash.digest_size
- if dkLen > digest:
- raise TypeError("Selected hash algorithm has a too short digest (%d bytes)." % digest)
- if len(salt) != 8:
- raise ValueError("Salt is not 8 bytes long (%d bytes instead)." % len(salt))
- for i in iter_range(count-1):
- pHash = pHash.new(pHash.digest())
- return pHash.digest()[:dkLen]
- def PBKDF2(password, salt, dkLen=16, count=1000, prf=None, hmac_hash_module=None):
- """Derive one or more keys from a password (or passphrase).
- This function performs key derivation according to the PKCS#5 standard (v2.0).
- Args:
- password (string or byte string):
- The secret password to generate the key from.
- salt (string or byte string):
- A (byte) string to use for better protection from dictionary attacks.
- This value does not need to be kept secret, but it should be randomly
- chosen for each derivation. It is recommended to use at least 16 bytes.
- dkLen (integer):
- The cumulative length of the keys to produce.
- Due to a flaw in the PBKDF2 design, you should not request more bytes
- than the ``prf`` can output. For instance, ``dkLen`` should not exceed
- 20 bytes in combination with ``HMAC-SHA1``.
- count (integer):
- The number of iterations to carry out. The higher the value, the slower
- and the more secure the function becomes.
- You should find the maximum number of iterations that keeps the
- key derivation still acceptable on the slowest hardware you must support.
- Although the default value is 1000, **it is recommended to use at least
- 1000000 (1 million) iterations**.
- prf (callable):
- A pseudorandom function. It must be a function that returns a
- pseudorandom byte string from two parameters: a secret and a salt.
- The slower the algorithm, the more secure the derivation function.
- If not specified, **HMAC-SHA1** is used.
- hmac_hash_module (module):
- A module from ``Cryptodome.Hash`` implementing a Merkle-Damgard cryptographic
- hash, which PBKDF2 must use in combination with HMAC.
- This parameter is mutually exclusive with ``prf``.
- Return:
- A byte string of length ``dkLen`` that can be used as key material.
- If you want multiple keys, just break up this string into segments of the desired length.
- """
- password = tobytes(password)
- salt = tobytes(salt)
- if prf and hmac_hash_module:
- raise ValueError("'prf' and 'hmac_hash_module' are mutually exlusive")
- if prf is None and hmac_hash_module is None:
- hmac_hash_module = SHA1
- if prf or not hasattr(hmac_hash_module, "_pbkdf2_hmac_assist"):
- # Generic (and slow) implementation
- if prf is None:
- prf = lambda p,s: HMAC.new(p, s, hmac_hash_module).digest()
- def link(s):
- s[0], s[1] = s[1], prf(password, s[1])
- return s[0]
- key = b''
- i = 1
- while len(key) < dkLen:
- s = [ prf(password, salt + struct.pack(">I", i)) ] * 2
- key += reduce(strxor, (link(s) for j in range(count)) )
- i += 1
- else:
- # Optimized implementation
- key = b''
- i = 1
- while len(key)<dkLen:
- base = HMAC.new(password, b"", hmac_hash_module)
- first_digest = base.copy().update(salt + struct.pack(">I", i)).digest()
- key += base._pbkdf2_hmac_assist(first_digest, count)
- i += 1
- return key[:dkLen]
- class _S2V(object):
- """String-to-vector PRF as defined in `RFC5297`_.
- This class implements a pseudorandom function family
- based on CMAC that takes as input a vector of strings.
- .. _RFC5297: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5297
- """
- def __init__(self, key, ciphermod, cipher_params=None):
- """Initialize the S2V PRF.
- :Parameters:
- key : byte string
- A secret that can be used as key for CMACs
- based on ciphers from ``ciphermod``.
- ciphermod : module
- A block cipher module from `Cryptodome.Cipher`.
- cipher_params : dictionary
- A set of extra parameters to use to create a cipher instance.
- """
- self._key = _copy_bytes(None, None, key)
- self._ciphermod = ciphermod
- self._last_string = self._cache = b'\x00' * ciphermod.block_size
-
- # Max number of update() call we can process
- self._n_updates = ciphermod.block_size * 8 - 1
-
- if cipher_params is None:
- self._cipher_params = {}
- else:
- self._cipher_params = dict(cipher_params)
- @staticmethod
- def new(key, ciphermod):
- """Create a new S2V PRF.
- :Parameters:
- key : byte string
- A secret that can be used as key for CMACs
- based on ciphers from ``ciphermod``.
- ciphermod : module
- A block cipher module from `Cryptodome.Cipher`.
- """
- return _S2V(key, ciphermod)
- def _double(self, bs):
- doubled = bytes_to_long(bs)<<1
- if bord(bs[0]) & 0x80:
- doubled ^= 0x87
- return long_to_bytes(doubled, len(bs))[-len(bs):]
- def update(self, item):
- """Pass the next component of the vector.
- The maximum number of components you can pass is equal to the block
- length of the cipher (in bits) minus 1.
- :Parameters:
- item : byte string
- The next component of the vector.
- :Raise TypeError: when the limit on the number of components has been reached.
- """
- if self._n_updates == 0:
- raise TypeError("Too many components passed to S2V")
- self._n_updates -= 1
- mac = CMAC.new(self._key,
- msg=self._last_string,
- ciphermod=self._ciphermod,
- cipher_params=self._cipher_params)
- self._cache = strxor(self._double(self._cache), mac.digest())
- self._last_string = _copy_bytes(None, None, item)
- def derive(self):
- """"Derive a secret from the vector of components.
- :Return: a byte string, as long as the block length of the cipher.
- """
- if len(self._last_string) >= 16:
- # xorend
- final = self._last_string[:-16] + strxor(self._last_string[-16:], self._cache)
- else:
- # zero-pad & xor
- padded = (self._last_string + b'\x80' + b'\x00' * 15)[:16]
- final = strxor(padded, self._double(self._cache))
- mac = CMAC.new(self._key,
- msg=final,
- ciphermod=self._ciphermod,
- cipher_params=self._cipher_params)
- return mac.digest()
- def HKDF(master, key_len, salt, hashmod, num_keys=1, context=None):
- """Derive one or more keys from a master secret using
- the HMAC-based KDF defined in RFC5869_.
- Args:
- master (byte string):
- The unguessable value used by the KDF to generate the other keys.
- It must be a high-entropy secret, though not necessarily uniform.
- It must not be a password.
- salt (byte string):
- A non-secret, reusable value that strengthens the randomness
- extraction step.
- Ideally, it is as long as the digest size of the chosen hash.
- If empty, a string of zeroes in used.
- key_len (integer):
- The length in bytes of every derived key.
- hashmod (module):
- A cryptographic hash algorithm from :mod:`Cryptodome.Hash`.
- :mod:`Cryptodome.Hash.SHA512` is a good choice.
- num_keys (integer):
- The number of keys to derive. Every key is :data:`key_len` bytes long.
- The maximum cumulative length of all keys is
- 255 times the digest size.
- context (byte string):
- Optional identifier describing what the keys are used for.
- Return:
- A byte string or a tuple of byte strings.
- .. _RFC5869: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869
- """
- output_len = key_len * num_keys
- if output_len > (255 * hashmod.digest_size):
- raise ValueError("Too much secret data to derive")
- if not salt:
- salt = b'\x00' * hashmod.digest_size
- if context is None:
- context = b""
- # Step 1: extract
- hmac = HMAC.new(salt, master, digestmod=hashmod)
- prk = hmac.digest()
- # Step 2: expand
- t = [ b"" ]
- n = 1
- tlen = 0
- while tlen < output_len:
- hmac = HMAC.new(prk, t[-1] + context + struct.pack('B', n), digestmod=hashmod)
- t.append(hmac.digest())
- tlen += hashmod.digest_size
- n += 1
- derived_output = b"".join(t)
- if num_keys == 1:
- return derived_output[:key_len]
- kol = [derived_output[idx:idx + key_len]
- for idx in iter_range(0, output_len, key_len)]
- return list(kol[:num_keys])
- def scrypt(password, salt, key_len, N, r, p, num_keys=1):
- """Derive one or more keys from a passphrase.
- Args:
- password (string):
- The secret pass phrase to generate the keys from.
- salt (string):
- A string to use for better protection from dictionary attacks.
- This value does not need to be kept secret,
- but it should be randomly chosen for each derivation.
- It is recommended to be at least 16 bytes long.
- key_len (integer):
- The length in bytes of every derived key.
- N (integer):
- CPU/Memory cost parameter. It must be a power of 2 and less
- than :math:`2^{32}`.
- r (integer):
- Block size parameter.
- p (integer):
- Parallelization parameter.
- It must be no greater than :math:`(2^{32}-1)/(4r)`.
- num_keys (integer):
- The number of keys to derive. Every key is :data:`key_len` bytes long.
- By default, only 1 key is generated.
- The maximum cumulative length of all keys is :math:`(2^{32}-1)*32`
- (that is, 128TB).
- A good choice of parameters *(N, r , p)* was suggested
- by Colin Percival in his `presentation in 2009`__:
- - *( 2¹⁴, 8, 1 )* for interactive logins (≤100ms)
- - *( 2²⁰, 8, 1 )* for file encryption (≤5s)
- Return:
- A byte string or a tuple of byte strings.
- .. __: http://www.tarsnap.com/scrypt/scrypt-slides.pdf
- """
- if 2 ** (bit_size(N) - 1) != N:
- raise ValueError("N must be a power of 2")
- if N >= 2 ** 32:
- raise ValueError("N is too big")
- if p > ((2 ** 32 - 1) * 32) // (128 * r):
- raise ValueError("p or r are too big")
- prf_hmac_sha256 = lambda p, s: HMAC.new(p, s, SHA256).digest()
- stage_1 = PBKDF2(password, salt, p * 128 * r, 1, prf=prf_hmac_sha256)
- scryptROMix = _raw_scrypt_lib.scryptROMix
- core = _raw_salsa20_lib.Salsa20_8_core
- # Parallelize into p flows
- data_out = []
- for flow in iter_range(p):
- idx = flow * 128 * r
- buffer_out = create_string_buffer(128 * r)
- result = scryptROMix(stage_1[idx : idx + 128 * r],
- buffer_out,
- c_size_t(128 * r),
- N,
- core)
- if result:
- raise ValueError("Error %X while running scrypt" % result)
- data_out += [ get_raw_buffer(buffer_out) ]
- dk = PBKDF2(password,
- b"".join(data_out),
- key_len * num_keys, 1,
- prf=prf_hmac_sha256)
- if num_keys == 1:
- return dk
- kol = [dk[idx:idx + key_len]
- for idx in iter_range(0, key_len * num_keys, key_len)]
- return kol
- def _bcrypt_encode(data):
- s = "./ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789"
- bits = []
- for c in data:
- bits_c = bin(bord(c))[2:].zfill(8)
- bits.append(bstr(bits_c))
- bits = b"".join(bits)
- bits6 = [ bits[idx:idx+6] for idx in range(0, len(bits), 6) ]
- result = []
- for g in bits6[:-1]:
- idx = int(g, 2)
- result.append(s[idx])
- g = bits6[-1]
- idx = int(g, 2) << (6 - len(g))
- result.append(s[idx])
- result = "".join(result)
- return tobytes(result)
- def _bcrypt_decode(data):
- s = "./ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789"
- bits = []
- for c in tostr(data):
- idx = s.find(c)
- bits6 = bin(idx)[2:].zfill(6)
- bits.append(bits6)
- bits = "".join(bits)
- modulo4 = len(data) % 4
- if modulo4 == 1:
- raise ValueError("Incorrect length")
- elif modulo4 == 2:
- bits = bits[:-4]
- elif modulo4 == 3:
- bits = bits[:-2]
- bits8 = [ bits[idx:idx+8] for idx in range(0, len(bits), 8) ]
- result = []
- for g in bits8:
- result.append(bchr(int(g, 2)))
- result = b"".join(result)
- return result
- def _bcrypt_hash(password, cost, salt, constant, invert):
- from Cryptodome.Cipher import _EKSBlowfish
- if len(password) > 72:
- raise ValueError("The password is too long. It must be 72 bytes at most.")
- if not (4 <= cost <= 31):
- raise ValueError("bcrypt cost factor must be in the range 4..31")
- cipher = _EKSBlowfish.new(password, _EKSBlowfish.MODE_ECB, salt, cost, invert)
- ctext = constant
- for _ in range(64):
- ctext = cipher.encrypt(ctext)
- return ctext
- def bcrypt(password, cost, salt=None):
- """Hash a password into a key, using the OpenBSD bcrypt protocol.
- Args:
- password (byte string or string):
- The secret password or pass phrase.
- It must be at most 72 bytes long.
- It must not contain the zero byte.
- Unicode strings will be encoded as UTF-8.
- cost (integer):
- The exponential factor that makes it slower to compute the hash.
- It must be in the range 4 to 31.
- A value of at least 12 is recommended.
- salt (byte string):
- Optional. Random byte string to thwarts dictionary and rainbow table
- attacks. It must be 16 bytes long.
- If not passed, a random value is generated.
- Return (byte string):
- The bcrypt hash
- Raises:
- ValueError: if password is longer than 72 bytes or if it contains the zero byte
- """
- password = tobytes(password, "utf-8")
- if password.find(bchr(0)[0]) != -1:
- raise ValueError("The password contains the zero byte")
- if len(password) < 72:
- password += b"\x00"
- if salt is None:
- salt = get_random_bytes(16)
- if len(salt) != 16:
- raise ValueError("bcrypt salt must be 16 bytes long")
- ctext = _bcrypt_hash(password, cost, salt, b"OrpheanBeholderScryDoubt", True)
- cost_enc = b"$" + bstr(str(cost).zfill(2))
- salt_enc = b"$" + _bcrypt_encode(salt)
- hash_enc = _bcrypt_encode(ctext[:-1]) # only use 23 bytes, not 24
- return b"$2a" + cost_enc + salt_enc + hash_enc
- def bcrypt_check(password, bcrypt_hash):
- """Verify if the provided password matches the given bcrypt hash.
- Args:
- password (byte string or string):
- The secret password or pass phrase to test.
- It must be at most 72 bytes long.
- It must not contain the zero byte.
- Unicode strings will be encoded as UTF-8.
- bcrypt_hash (byte string, bytearray):
- The reference bcrypt hash the password needs to be checked against.
- Raises:
- ValueError: if the password does not match
- """
- bcrypt_hash = tobytes(bcrypt_hash)
- if len(bcrypt_hash) != 60:
- raise ValueError("Incorrect length of the bcrypt hash: %d bytes instead of 60" % len(bcrypt_hash))
- if bcrypt_hash[:4] != b'$2a$':
- raise ValueError("Unsupported prefix")
- p = re.compile(br'\$2a\$([0-9][0-9])\$([A-Za-z0-9./]{22,22})([A-Za-z0-9./]{31,31})')
- r = p.match(bcrypt_hash)
- if not r:
- raise ValueError("Incorrect bcrypt hash format")
- cost = int(r.group(1))
- if not (4 <= cost <= 31):
- raise ValueError("Incorrect cost")
- salt = _bcrypt_decode(r.group(2))
- bcrypt_hash2 = bcrypt(password, cost, salt)
- secret = get_random_bytes(16)
- mac1 = BLAKE2s.new(digest_bits=160, key=secret, data=bcrypt_hash).digest()
- mac2 = BLAKE2s.new(digest_bits=160, key=secret, data=bcrypt_hash2).digest()
- if mac1 != mac2:
- raise ValueError("Incorrect bcrypt hash")
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