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- # ===================================================================
- #
- # Copyright (c) 2014, Legrandin <helderijs@gmail.com>
- # All rights reserved.
- #
- # Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- # modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- # are met:
- #
- # 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- # 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- # the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- # distribution.
- #
- # THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
- # "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
- # LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS
- # FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
- # COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- # INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING,
- # BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- # LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER
- # CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- # LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN
- # ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
- # POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- # ===================================================================
- """
- EAX mode.
- """
- __all__ = ['EaxMode']
- import struct
- from binascii import unhexlify
- from Cryptodome.Util.py3compat import byte_string, bord, _copy_bytes
- from Cryptodome.Util._raw_api import is_buffer
- from Cryptodome.Util.strxor import strxor
- from Cryptodome.Util.number import long_to_bytes, bytes_to_long
- from Cryptodome.Hash import CMAC, BLAKE2s
- from Cryptodome.Random import get_random_bytes
- class EaxMode(object):
- """*EAX* mode.
- This is an Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
- (`AEAD`_) mode. It provides both confidentiality and authenticity.
- The header of the message may be left in the clear, if needed,
- and it will still be subject to authentication.
- The decryption step tells the receiver if the message comes
- from a source that really knowns the secret key.
- Additionally, decryption detects if any part of the message -
- including the header - has been modified or corrupted.
- This mode requires a *nonce*.
- This mode is only available for ciphers that operate on 64 or
- 128 bits blocks.
- There are no official standards defining EAX.
- The implementation is based on `a proposal`__ that
- was presented to NIST.
- .. _AEAD: http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2012/05/how-to-choose-authenticated-encryption.html
- .. __: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/proposedmodes/eax/eax-spec.pdf
- :undocumented: __init__
- """
- def __init__(self, factory, key, nonce, mac_len, cipher_params):
- """EAX cipher mode"""
- self.block_size = factory.block_size
- """The block size of the underlying cipher, in bytes."""
- self.nonce = _copy_bytes(None, None, nonce)
- """The nonce originally used to create the object."""
- self._mac_len = mac_len
- self._mac_tag = None # Cache for MAC tag
- # Allowed transitions after initialization
- self._next = [self.update, self.encrypt, self.decrypt,
- self.digest, self.verify]
- # MAC tag length
- if not (4 <= self._mac_len <= self.block_size):
- raise ValueError("Parameter 'mac_len' must not be larger than %d"
- % self.block_size)
- # Nonce cannot be empty and must be a byte string
- if len(self.nonce) == 0:
- raise ValueError("Nonce cannot be empty in EAX mode")
- if not is_buffer(nonce):
- raise TypeError("nonce must be bytes, bytearray or memoryview")
- self._omac = [
- CMAC.new(key,
- b'\x00' * (self.block_size - 1) + struct.pack('B', i),
- ciphermod=factory,
- cipher_params=cipher_params)
- for i in range(0, 3)
- ]
- # Compute MAC of nonce
- self._omac[0].update(self.nonce)
- self._signer = self._omac[1]
- # MAC of the nonce is also the initial counter for CTR encryption
- counter_int = bytes_to_long(self._omac[0].digest())
- self._cipher = factory.new(key,
- factory.MODE_CTR,
- initial_value=counter_int,
- nonce=b"",
- **cipher_params)
- def update(self, assoc_data):
- """Protect associated data
- If there is any associated data, the caller has to invoke
- this function one or more times, before using
- ``decrypt`` or ``encrypt``.
- By *associated data* it is meant any data (e.g. packet headers) that
- will not be encrypted and will be transmitted in the clear.
- However, the receiver is still able to detect any modification to it.
- If there is no associated data, this method must not be called.
- The caller may split associated data in segments of any size, and
- invoke this method multiple times, each time with the next segment.
- :Parameters:
- assoc_data : bytes/bytearray/memoryview
- A piece of associated data. There are no restrictions on its size.
- """
- if self.update not in self._next:
- raise TypeError("update() can only be called"
- " immediately after initialization")
- self._next = [self.update, self.encrypt, self.decrypt,
- self.digest, self.verify]
- self._signer.update(assoc_data)
- return self
- def encrypt(self, plaintext, output=None):
- """Encrypt data with the key and the parameters set at initialization.
- A cipher object is stateful: once you have encrypted a message
- you cannot encrypt (or decrypt) another message using the same
- object.
- The data to encrypt can be broken up in two or
- more pieces and `encrypt` can be called multiple times.
- That is, the statement:
- >>> c.encrypt(a) + c.encrypt(b)
- is equivalent to:
- >>> c.encrypt(a+b)
- This function does not add any padding to the plaintext.
- :Parameters:
- plaintext : bytes/bytearray/memoryview
- The piece of data to encrypt.
- It can be of any length.
- :Keywords:
- output : bytearray/memoryview
- The location where the ciphertext must be written to.
- If ``None``, the ciphertext is returned.
- :Return:
- If ``output`` is ``None``, the ciphertext as ``bytes``.
- Otherwise, ``None``.
- """
- if self.encrypt not in self._next:
- raise TypeError("encrypt() can only be called after"
- " initialization or an update()")
- self._next = [self.encrypt, self.digest]
- ct = self._cipher.encrypt(plaintext, output=output)
- if output is None:
- self._omac[2].update(ct)
- else:
- self._omac[2].update(output)
- return ct
- def decrypt(self, ciphertext, output=None):
- """Decrypt data with the key and the parameters set at initialization.
- A cipher object is stateful: once you have decrypted a message
- you cannot decrypt (or encrypt) another message with the same
- object.
- The data to decrypt can be broken up in two or
- more pieces and `decrypt` can be called multiple times.
- That is, the statement:
- >>> c.decrypt(a) + c.decrypt(b)
- is equivalent to:
- >>> c.decrypt(a+b)
- This function does not remove any padding from the plaintext.
- :Parameters:
- ciphertext : bytes/bytearray/memoryview
- The piece of data to decrypt.
- It can be of any length.
- :Keywords:
- output : bytearray/memoryview
- The location where the plaintext must be written to.
- If ``None``, the plaintext is returned.
- :Return:
- If ``output`` is ``None``, the plaintext as ``bytes``.
- Otherwise, ``None``.
- """
- if self.decrypt not in self._next:
- raise TypeError("decrypt() can only be called"
- " after initialization or an update()")
- self._next = [self.decrypt, self.verify]
- self._omac[2].update(ciphertext)
- return self._cipher.decrypt(ciphertext, output=output)
- def digest(self):
- """Compute the *binary* MAC tag.
- The caller invokes this function at the very end.
- This method returns the MAC that shall be sent to the receiver,
- together with the ciphertext.
- :Return: the MAC, as a byte string.
- """
- if self.digest not in self._next:
- raise TypeError("digest() cannot be called when decrypting"
- " or validating a message")
- self._next = [self.digest]
- if not self._mac_tag:
- tag = b'\x00' * self.block_size
- for i in range(3):
- tag = strxor(tag, self._omac[i].digest())
- self._mac_tag = tag[:self._mac_len]
- return self._mac_tag
- def hexdigest(self):
- """Compute the *printable* MAC tag.
- This method is like `digest`.
- :Return: the MAC, as a hexadecimal string.
- """
- return "".join(["%02x" % bord(x) for x in self.digest()])
- def verify(self, received_mac_tag):
- """Validate the *binary* MAC tag.
- The caller invokes this function at the very end.
- This method checks if the decrypted message is indeed valid
- (that is, if the key is correct) and it has not been
- tampered with while in transit.
- :Parameters:
- received_mac_tag : bytes/bytearray/memoryview
- This is the *binary* MAC, as received from the sender.
- :Raises MacMismatchError:
- if the MAC does not match. The message has been tampered with
- or the key is incorrect.
- """
- if self.verify not in self._next:
- raise TypeError("verify() cannot be called"
- " when encrypting a message")
- self._next = [self.verify]
- if not self._mac_tag:
- tag = b'\x00' * self.block_size
- for i in range(3):
- tag = strxor(tag, self._omac[i].digest())
- self._mac_tag = tag[:self._mac_len]
- secret = get_random_bytes(16)
- mac1 = BLAKE2s.new(digest_bits=160, key=secret, data=self._mac_tag)
- mac2 = BLAKE2s.new(digest_bits=160, key=secret, data=received_mac_tag)
- if mac1.digest() != mac2.digest():
- raise ValueError("MAC check failed")
- def hexverify(self, hex_mac_tag):
- """Validate the *printable* MAC tag.
- This method is like `verify`.
- :Parameters:
- hex_mac_tag : string
- This is the *printable* MAC, as received from the sender.
- :Raises MacMismatchError:
- if the MAC does not match. The message has been tampered with
- or the key is incorrect.
- """
- self.verify(unhexlify(hex_mac_tag))
- def encrypt_and_digest(self, plaintext, output=None):
- """Perform encrypt() and digest() in one step.
- :Parameters:
- plaintext : bytes/bytearray/memoryview
- The piece of data to encrypt.
- :Keywords:
- output : bytearray/memoryview
- The location where the ciphertext must be written to.
- If ``None``, the ciphertext is returned.
- :Return:
- a tuple with two items:
- - the ciphertext, as ``bytes``
- - the MAC tag, as ``bytes``
- The first item becomes ``None`` when the ``output`` parameter
- specified a location for the result.
- """
- return self.encrypt(plaintext, output=output), self.digest()
- def decrypt_and_verify(self, ciphertext, received_mac_tag, output=None):
- """Perform decrypt() and verify() in one step.
- :Parameters:
- ciphertext : bytes/bytearray/memoryview
- The piece of data to decrypt.
- received_mac_tag : bytes/bytearray/memoryview
- This is the *binary* MAC, as received from the sender.
- :Keywords:
- output : bytearray/memoryview
- The location where the plaintext must be written to.
- If ``None``, the plaintext is returned.
- :Return: the plaintext as ``bytes`` or ``None`` when the ``output``
- parameter specified a location for the result.
- :Raises MacMismatchError:
- if the MAC does not match. The message has been tampered with
- or the key is incorrect.
- """
- pt = self.decrypt(ciphertext, output=output)
- self.verify(received_mac_tag)
- return pt
- def _create_eax_cipher(factory, **kwargs):
- """Create a new block cipher, configured in EAX mode.
- :Parameters:
- factory : module
- A symmetric cipher module from `Cryptodome.Cipher` (like
- `Cryptodome.Cipher.AES`).
- :Keywords:
- key : bytes/bytearray/memoryview
- The secret key to use in the symmetric cipher.
- nonce : bytes/bytearray/memoryview
- A value that must never be reused for any other encryption.
- There are no restrictions on its length, but it is recommended to use
- at least 16 bytes.
- The nonce shall never repeat for two different messages encrypted with
- the same key, but it does not need to be random.
- If not specified, a 16 byte long random string is used.
- mac_len : integer
- Length of the MAC, in bytes. It must be no larger than the cipher
- block bytes (which is the default).
- """
- try:
- key = kwargs.pop("key")
- nonce = kwargs.pop("nonce", None)
- if nonce is None:
- nonce = get_random_bytes(16)
- mac_len = kwargs.pop("mac_len", factory.block_size)
- except KeyError as e:
- raise TypeError("Missing parameter: " + str(e))
- return EaxMode(factory, key, nonce, mac_len, kwargs)
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