[[!meta title="Tor bridge mode"]]

[[!toc levels=1]]

What bridges are and when to use them
=====================================

When using Tor with Tails in its default configuration, anyone who can
observe the traffic of your Internet connection (for example your
Internet Service Provider and perhaps your government and law
enforcement agencies) can know that you are using Tor.

This may be an issue if you are in a country where the following
applies:

1. **Using Tor is blocked by censorship:** since all connections to the
   Internet are forced to go through Tor, this would render Tails useless for
   everything except for working offline on documents, etc.

2. **Using Tor is dangerous or considered suspicious:** in this case
   starting Tails in its default configuration might get you into
   serious trouble.

Tor bridges, also called Tor bridge relays, are alternative entry points
to the Tor network that are not all listed publicly. Using a bridge
makes it harder, but not impossible, for your Internet Service Provider
to know that you are using Tor.

If you are in one of the situations described above
you might want to use Tor bridges in Tails. Please also read
The Tor Project's [dedicated page about
bridges](https://www.torproject.org/docs/bridges) to get a general
idea about what bridges are.

In order to use Tor through bridges, you must know the address of at
least one bridge in advance. The Tor Project distributes bridge addresses in
several ways, for example from their
[website](https://bridges.torproject.org/) and via email.

<div class="note">

Bridges are less reliable and tend to have lower performance than other
entry points.

</div>

How to use bridges in Tails
===========================

You must have at hand at least one bridge address before
starting Tails. For example, you can write it down on a piece of paper
or store it in the [[persistent volume|doc/first_steps/persistence]].

Tails allows you to use bridges of the following types:

  - `bridge`
  - `obfs2`
  - `obfs3`
  - `obfs4`
  - `ScrambleSuit`

To use bridges, choose to configure bridge settings from
<span class="application">Tails Greeter</span>:

[[!inline pages="doc/first_steps/startup_options/bridge_mode.inline" raw="yes"]]

<div class="tip">

<p>After Tor is started, the bridges that you configured appear as the first
relay of your Tor circuits in
<span class="application">[[Onion Circuits|doc/anonymous_internet/tor_status#circuits]]</span>.</p>

</div>

If using Tor is dangerous in your country
=========================================

The Tor Project's [documentation on
bridges](https://www.torproject.org/docs/bridges) mainly focuses on
censorship circumvention: when using Tor is blocked by
censorship. If using Tor is dangerous or considered suspicious in your
country, then there are some extra rules that you should follow in order
to prevent yourself from being identified as a Tor user.

<div class="caution">

Bridges are important tools that work in many cases but <strong>they are
not absolute protection</strong> against all techniques that
an adversary could do to identify Tor users.

</div>

1. Always start Tails in *bridge mode*.

2. Only use [*obfuscated
   bridges*](https://www.torproject.org/docs/bridges#PluggableTransports)
   since they are harder to identify than other bridges.

3. The less publicly known the bridges are, the better.
   Unfortunately, since some bridge addresses can be obtained by anyone
   from the Tor website or by email, it is also
   possible for an adversary to get the same
   bridge information by the same means. The Tor Project has some
   protection against that, but they are far from being perfect.

   So the best is if you can find a trusted friend or
   an organisation in a different country who runs a "private" *obfuscated
   bridge* for you. In this case "private" means that the bridge is
   configured with the option `PublishServerDescriptor 0`. Without this option The Tor
   Project will learn about the bridge and may distribute its address to others
   and so it could end up in the hands of your adversary.
